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COMMENTS
LUNDY, ISAAC AND FRADY: A TRILOGY OF
HABEAS CORPUS RESTRAINT
Liberal availability of federal habeas corpus review' has been praised as
the bulwark of protection from unconstitutional confinement,2 and decried
as undermining the finality of judgments and the goals of deterrence and
rehabilitation.3 Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners has been particu-
1. The writ of habeas corpus is a post-conviction remedy by which a prisoner may
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction and resulting confinement. See C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 53, 236 (3d ed. 1977). The remedy is not limited, however, to
post-conviction relief for prisoners. See, e.g., Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206 (1969) (order-
ing habeas corpus relief to United States Army reservist held under military custody beyond
his enlistment contract). This Comment is solely concerned with the writ as a post-convic-
tion remedy for state and federal prisoners. State prisoners seek habeas corpus relief from
custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See infra note 19. Federal prisoners utilize a motion
to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). See infra note 25. These present day
statutory remedies evolved from the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81 (habeas corpus
provision applied to federal prisoners only), and from the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat.
385 (1867) (empowering federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to federal and state
prisoners alike when detained "in violation of the Constitution") (currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)) (writs of habeas corpus may be granted to any prisoner in custody in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). For a comprehensive
history of federal habeas corpus, including a discussion of its ancient origins, see Develop-
ments in the La--Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
2. See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (referring to the writ as "both the
symbol and the guardian of individual liberty"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963)
("an efficacious and imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality"); Exparte
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) ("the best and only sufficient defence of personal
freedom").
3. Finality requires "the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that atten-
tion will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly and Professor Bator
suggest that the absence of finality frustrates the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. De-
terrence requires that one violating the law expects that he "will swiftly and certainly be-
come subject to punishment, just punishment." Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963). Judge Friendly ar-
gues that "[u]nbounded willingness to entertain collateral attacks on convictions must inter-
fere with at least one aim of punishment-'a realization by the convict that he is justly
subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation.'" Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 142, 146 (1970) (quoting
Bator, supra at 452).
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larly controversial because of the repugnance toward federal court supervi-
sion and control over state court judgments.4 In addition, critics have
charged that state prisoners "abuse" the writ by "flooding" the federal
courts with frivolous habeas petitions.5 Despite attempts to reform or re-
voke federal habeas relief for state prisoners,6 the scope of federal habeas
corpus review expanded steadily from 1953 to 1975.' The federal habeas
court was permitted to entertain all constitutional claims, absent a "delib-
erate bypass" of state procedural requirements8 and failure to exhaust
4. "There is an affront to state sensibilities when a single federal judge can order dis-
charge of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a state." C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 246. For discussion of resentment among state law enforcement
officials and judges because of "indiscriminate expansion [of federal habeas corpus] without
principled justification," see Bator, supra note 3, at 504-07. But see Developments, supra note
1, at 1057-62, expounding the thesis that a "dispassionate second look focused exclusively on
the adjudication of constitutional issues at trial may be necessary to ensure that a defen-
dant's federal constitutional rights are adequately protected." Id at 1057.
5. Recently, for example, in support of the Crime Control Act of 1980, S. 2543, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5449 (daily ed. May 19, 1982), Senator Chiles, author of
the proposed legislation, asserted that "[tihe abusive and repetitive use of habeas corpus
petitions by State court convicts to attack their convictions is a problem which is clearly out
of hand." 128 CONG. REC. S8871 (daily ed. July 22, 1982). But see infra notes 310-314 and
accompanying text. In 1976, Chief Justice Burger reported that "[flully a sixth [19,500 or
16.6%] of the 117,000 cases of the civil docket of federal courts are petitions from prisoners,
most of which could be handled effectively and fairly within the prison systems." Burger,
Annual Report to the American Bar 4ssociation by the Chief Justice of the United States, 62
A.B.A. J. 189, 190 (1976). It is important to note, however, that of these 19,000 prisoner
petitions, 14,260 were filed by state prisoners of which only 7,843 (6.7% of the total civil
docket) were habeas petitions. See 1975 ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. at 206-
08.
6. A proposed addition to the habeas statutes would have limited the review of state
criminal convictions to the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See S. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 63-66, 122 (1967). Other proposals would have required a three-judge
federal court for review of habeas corpus applications. See H.R. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
36 (1966) and ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., at 313. See also C. WRIGHT,
supra note i, at 247; Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance of Justice, and the
Great Writ of Habeas Corpus:" How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 AMER.
CRIM. L. REV. 63, 72 n.86 (1977); Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpusfor
State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973).
7. See infra notes 43-78 and accompanying text. See generally Developments, supra
note 1, at 1056-66.
8. Prior to 1963, however, a petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural re-
quirement constituted an adequate state ground for denying federal habeas review. See in-
/ ra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. This view was abandoned when, in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court adopted the deliberate bypass standard for deter-
mining whether federal habeas review would be barred by a procedural default. See infra
notes 52-65 and accompanying text. Until 1977, failure to challenge grand jury composition





In Wainwright v. Sykes,' ° however, the United States Supreme Court
firmly curtailed liberal availability of federal habeas review for state pris-
oners in cases of procedural default. I In Sykes, the Court renounced the
deliberate bypass waiver standard enunciated in Fay v. Noia,'2 and
adopted the more stringent "cause" and "actual prejudice" requirement
for overcoming procedural defaults.' 3 Since Sykes, federal courts, legal
practitioners and pro se petitioners have awaited fulfillment of the Court's
promise that later cases would define the cause and prejudice standard."
In the 1981 Term,' 5 the Supreme Court responded in opinions authored by
Justice O'Connor,' 6 addressing the issue of cause in Engle v. Isaac,7 and
actual prejudice in United States v. Frady.
I8
In Isaac, state prisoners who failed to comply with an Ohio rule man-
dating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, were barred from
challenging the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal habeas
proceeding under section 2254'9 absent a showing of cause and actual
prejudice excusing their procedural default.2" The Supreme Court rejected
the respondents' argument that the principles of Sykes should be limited to
cases in which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding func-
tion of the trial."' The Court ruled that the futility of presenting an objec-
tion to the state court cannot alone constitute cause.2 2 Furthermore, cause
is not established by the alleged unawareness of a constitutional objection
when that constitutional claim has been previously litigated by other de-
fense counsel.2 3 Because cause was found lacking in this case, the Court
9. See infra notes 48-50 & 58-60 and accompanying text.
10. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
1i. Sykes required a showing of cause and actual prejudice to excuse a habeas peti-
tioner's failure to comply with an adequate state procedural requirement, which would
otherwise operate to bar habeas corpus review. Id See infra notes 94-108 and accompany-
ing text.
12. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
14. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
15. October Term, 1981.
16. Justice O'Connor was invested on September 25, 1981.
17. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
18. 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides that federal courts "shall entertain an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."
20. 102 S. Ct. at 1575.
21. Id. at 1572. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 1572. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 1574-75. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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did not consider whether these state prisoners suffered actual prejudice.24
In Frady, a federal prisoner sought to have his sentence vacated under
section 2255,25 alleging that he was convicted by a jury erroneously in-
structed on the meaning of malice.26 Frady had not objected to the in-
structions at trial or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court rejected
application of the "plain error" standard of review 27 in motions under sec-
tion 2255 and held the cause and actual prejudice requirement applicable
to claims brought by federal prisoners.28  The Court did not inquire
whether Frady had demonstrated cause for his failure to object to the erro-
neous jury instructions because he had not demonstrated actual
prejudice. 29 Frady failed to carry the burden of showing that the errone-
ous jury instructions "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,
infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions."3 The
Court found that this would have been a different case if Frady had been
able to come forward with affirmative evidence that he had been wrongly
convicted of a crime.
31
Isaac and Frady are based upon policy considerations and the principles
of comity,3 2 federalism and finality of judgments which, in the Court's
view, necessitate strict adherence to the Sykes' cause and actual prejudice
requirement. These decisions, however, far exceed Sykes. Isaac requires a
showing of cause for defects that may have affected the determination of
guilt at trial.33 Frady requires what amounts to a "colorable showing of
24. 102 S. Ct. at 1575 n.43. See infra note 187.
25. Section 2255 is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. However, the
term "habeas corpus" is commonly utilized to refer to petitions of federal prisoners under
§ 2255 and will be similarly addressed in this Comment. See United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (holding that § 2255 is as broad as habeas corpus); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977) (using the term "habeas corpus" in referring to its decision in
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), which involved a federal prisoner's motion for
collateral review under § 2255). See also Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050, 1053 & nn.23-24 (1978).
26. 102 S. Ct. at 1589.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they are not brought to the attention of the court." See infra notes
217-19 and accompanying text.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 1593-94. See notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
29. 102 S. Ct. at 1594. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1596. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 1596. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
32. In general, the doctrine of comity between courts advises that "one court should
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to
pass upon the matter." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 204 (1950)). See also Covell v. Heyman, Ill U.S. 176, 182 (1884).
33. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. In contrast, Sykes involved an alleged
[Vol. 32:169
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innocence ' 34 to establish actual prejudice.35 Synthesized with the Court's
decision in Rose v. Lundy,36 these cases indicate the Supreme Court's de-
termination to restrain liberal allowance of federal habeas review for both
state and federal prisoners.37
In order to promote the interests of comity and federalism, the Court in
Lundy adopted a per se rule requiring federal district courts to dismiss
every habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner under section 2254
presenting unexhausted claims.38 Under this "total. exhaustion" rule,39 the
petitioner may elect to return to state court to exhaust all claims, or to
delete the unexhausted claims and proceed with those that have been ex-
hausted in the state courts.' The plurality cautioned, however, that if the
petitioner chooses to delete the unexhausted claims, federal review may be
forfeited when those claims are resubmitted in a subsequent petition fol-
lowing exhaustion. The plurality asserted that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
Rule 9(b),41 a district court may dismiss those petitions if the court finds
that "the failure of the petitioner to assert those [new] grounds in a prior
petition constituted an abuse of the writ."42
This Comment presents an overview of the Supreme Court's progression
in applying the requirements of exhaustion of state court remedies and
compliance with adequate state procedures to limit federal habeas corpus
violation of Miranda rights. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See Friendly, supra
note 3, at 163-64 (suggesting that Miranda claims generally do not involve "the kind of
constitutional claim that casts some shadow of doubt upon the defendant's guilt." (quoting
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting))).
34. See infra note 299.
35. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
36. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
37. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that search and seizure
claims may not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions "where the
state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim.");
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). But see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
38. 102 S. Ct. at 1205.
39. Previously, only two circuit courts of appeals required total exhaustion before af-
fording habeas corpus review. See infra note 117.
40. Id. at 1204.
41. Rule 9(b) provides:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure
of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of
the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1976).
42. Id at 1204-05 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b)) (only three members of the
Court, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist and Powell, joined Justice O'Connor in
this portion of the opinion),
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review of petitions filed by state and federal prisoners. It examines the
Supreme Court's increasing willingness to defer to state procedural re-
quirements and to adhere strictly to the exhaustion requirement in order to
accommodate the interests of comity, federalism, and finality of judg-
ments. Following an examination of the Court's recent decisions in Lundy,
Isaac and Frady, this Comment analyzes the implications of these deci-
sions for the federal courts, pro se petitioners, and attorneys handling fed-
eral habeas claims. The Comment demonstrates that the Court has failed
to assist adequately federal courts in defining the parameters of cause and
actual prejudice, and has imposed a great burden of duplicative review
upon the federal courts under the total exhaustion requirement. This
Comment concludes that the deeper significance of Lundy, Isaac and
Frady is their effective evisceration of habeas corpus as a federal forum for
the vindication of the federal constitutional claims of state and federal
prisoners.
I. THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies and Procedural Forfeitures as Limiting
Principles under Brown v. Allen
In the landmark case of Brown v. Allen,43 the Supreme Court extended
habeas corpus review to all federal constitutional questions presented by
state prisoners. The Court placed within the "sound discretion" of the fed-
eral district court judge the decision whether to redetermine the federal
constitutional claims of state prisoners, regardless of the adequacy of state
procedure or the state court's full and fair consideration of the claim. 4
43. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown v. Allen was a consolidation of three cases: Brown v.
Allen, Speller v. Allen, and Daniels v. Allen.
44. Id at 460-65. In a separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter explained the underlying
rationale. Id at 497-513 (opinion of Frankfurter, 1.). While the district judge must consider
state proceedings, the prior state determination cannot foreclose consideration of such
claims by the federal habeas court because Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided that the
state court should not have the final say. Id. at 500. "[N]o binding weight is to be attached
to the state determination. The congressional requirement is greater. The State court can-
not have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right." Id at 508. Over a
century prior to Brown, habeas corpus relief for a prisoner was available only for a lack of
jurisdiction in the detaining court. Expare Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). See also
Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (court without jurisdiction to impose second
sentence when first had been served as one of the alternative punishments provided by law);
Exparie Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879) (because the laws under which the defendant
was convicted were unconstitutional and therefore void, the court acquired no jurisdiction
over the causes before it). In 1915, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
[Vol. 32:169
Habeas Corpus Restraint
The Court provided that, although the federal court has thepower, it need
not "hold hearings on the merits, facts or law" when the state courts have
adequately protected federal constitutional rights.45 The district court,
however, was directed to exercise jurisdiction to the extent of examining
the record to determine whether the "ends of justice" require a hearing.46
The Supreme Court clarified two limitations upon the federal court's
discretion to entertain the constitutional claims of state prisoners. First,
although the petitioner must exhaust available state remedies under sec-
tion 2254, that section does not require the prisoner to repeat attempts to
utilize the same state remedy, nor to make more than one attempt where
alternative state remedies are available.47 Second, in the companion case
inquiry on federal habeas corpus need not end upon a showing that the conviction was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The
federal court could review the state court determination of the petitioner's federal constitu-
tional claim. Habeas corpus relief would be denied, however, when the state had afforded
adequate corrective process for reviewing the petitioner's claim. Id. at 331, 335-36. This
barrier was removed when, in Moore v. Dempsey, the Court determined that the existence
of adequate state procedures could not prevent federal habeas review to secure a petitioner's
constitutional rights if the state court had failed to correct the constitutional wrong. 261 U.S.
86, 91-92 (1923). Thereafter, habeas corpus review was extended or. a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (claims of coerced guilty plea). In Waley, the Court finally
abandoned the concept of jurisdiction as a limiting ground for habeas corpus review.
For a discussion of the debate on the legal and historical significance of Frank and Moore
concerning the scope of federal habeas review, see Bator, supra note 3, at 489 (interpreting
Frank as the initiator of de novo habeas review). But see Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus.:
Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1329-30 (1961); Hart, Fore-
word- The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
105 n.59 (1959) (interpreting Moore as the first decision allowing claims to be redetermined
de novo). See also Developments, supra note I, at 1051-56 (discussing Moore and the views
of commentators Reitz and Hart).
45. 344 U.S. at 464.
46. Id. The petitioner in Brown alleged issues of jury discrimination and admission of a
coerced confession. The Court found that the district court had not abused its discretion in
declining to grant the writ of habeas corpus without conducting a hearing on the federal
constitutional issues, because all issues were adequately presented to the state courts and the
complete record had been before the district court. Id at 465.
47. Id. at 502 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The Court determined that the petitioners in
all three cases had exhausted all required state procedures and need not return to the state
court for collateral relief. Id at 447 (majority opinion).
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of the exhaustion doctrine. In Ex
parte Royall, the Court held that although federal courts have the power to discharge a state
prisoner restrained in violation of the Constitution, to facilitate accord between courts
"equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution," the federal court
should abstain from proceeding on habeas corpus until the state court proceedings are com-
pleted. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) ("[I1t
would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a
state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional
violation."). In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion requirement, Act of June 25, 1948,
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of Daniels v. Allen,48 the Court acknowledged that, although section 2254
does not require repetitious applications to state courts for collateral relief,
the state's procedure for relief must nonetheless be employed "in order to
avoid the use of federal habeas corpus as a matter of procedural routine to
review state criminal rulings."49
In denying habeas corpus relief in Daniels, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that a prisoner's unconstitutional detention "is not to be tested by
the use of habeas corpus in lieu of an appeal."50 Thus, when a state proce-
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976)), incorporating
the principles of the Supreme Court's decision in Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). See
Reviser's Note H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. A180 (1948); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. at 447-50. In Hawk, the Court provided that while a petitioner must ordinarily exhaust
all available state remedies, the exhaustion doctrine does not bar relief when the state reme-
dies are inadequate or fail to "afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions
raised." 321 U.S. at 118. Section 2254(b)-(c) provides:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence
of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure the question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976).
48. 344 U.S. at 482.
49. Id at 487.
50. Id at 485 (footnote omitted). See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 180 (1947) (barring
collateral review of petition brought by federal prisoners who failed to take an appeal). But
see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (construing the Court's decision in Sunal
as limited to nonconstitutional claims asserted by federal prisoners). See also United States
v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will
not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment); Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the
claimed error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete mis-
carriage of justice"). The Court asserted that to hold otherwise would "subvert the entire
system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy in the detection and punishment of
crime." Id
In Daniels, the petitioners lost their right to proceed on habeas corpus because of their
procedural default in the state courts. 344 U.S. at 482-87. The state procedure required that
petitioners perfect their appeal within 60 days. The petitioners' counsel served the statement
of appeal after 61 days had passed. The trial judge struck the appeal as out of time. That
action precluded an appeal as of right to the state supreme court. /d at 484-85. The
Supreme Court found the denial of direct review constitutional, stating that "[a] period of
limitation accords with our conception of proper procedure." Id at 486. In contrast, federal
habeas review was properly afforded to the petitioner in Brown because the alleged discrimi-
natory selection of grand and petit jurors and admission of a coerced confession had been




dural requirement did not violate the Constitution, and when noncompli-
ance was sufficient to result in forfeiture on appeal, a state petitioner's
failure to comply with the adequate state procedure operated as an abso-
lute bar to federal habeas corpus review, absent some interference or
incapacity. 5'
B. The 1963 Trilogy. Expanding the Scope of Federal Habeas
Corpus Review
The severity of the Daniels forfeiture rule was alleviated in Fay v.
52Noia, one of a 1963 trilogy of expansive habeas corpus cases. In Noia,
the Supreme Court held that a state petitioner's failure to comply with a
state procedural requirement, sufficient to preclude state court appellate
review, would bar subsequent resort to the federal court for habeas corpus
relief only if the petitioner had deliberately bypassed state procedural
requirements.
5 3
Noia was convicted with two other defendants of a felony murder. The
sole evidence against each defendant was his unsigned confession. Noia
was denied state postconviction relief because his coerced confession claim
had been decided against him at trial and he had allowed the time for a
direct appeal to lapse.54 Noia was subsequently denied federal habeas
corpus review on the ground that section 2254 requires that an applicant
exhaust the remedies available in the state courts.55 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that exceptional
circumstances existed excusing Noia's compliance with that section.56 In
affirming the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that fed-
51. 344 U.S. at 486-87. Federal habeas corpus relief would be allowed when, for exam-
ple, "time has expired without appeal, when the prisoner is detained without opportunity to
appeal because of lack of counsel, incapacity, or some interference by officials." 344 U.S. at
486. See also Dowd v. United States ex. rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (prisoner's efforts to
file proper appeals papers within required time limits were frustrated by the warden acting
pursuant to prison rules); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (17 year old defen-
dant was deprived of constitutional right to a fair hearing where he was arraigned, convicted
on his guilty plea without benefit of counsel or apprisal of consequences of plea, and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment on same day information was filed); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (petitioner convicted and sentenced without the assistance of counsel).
52. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
53. Id. at 438. Noia also overruled the holding of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950),
that a state prisoner must ordinarily seek certiorari in the Supreme Court prior to applying
for federal habeas corpus review. Noia, 372 U.S. at 435-38.
54. The other two defendants had appealed, unsuccessfully, but were released after sub-
sequent legal proceedings found that their confessions had been coerced in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 372 U.S. at 394-95.
55. Id. at 394-96.
56. Id. at 397.
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eral courts have power to grant habeas corpus relief despite a petitioner's
failure to exhaust a state court remedy no longer available when his
habeas corpus petition is filed.57 The Court construed section 2254 as lim-
ited in its application to failure to exhaust state remedies "still open" to the
petitioner at the time he seeks federal habeas corpus relief.58 Since Noia
could no longer appeal his conviction, he was not precluded from federal
habeas corpus review on exhaustion grounds.59
The Court then addressed whether Noia should be barred from federal
habeas corpus review because of his failure to comply with state appellate
procedures. Recognizing the question's significance for the principles of
comity and federalism,60 the Court reasoned that the strong interest of the
states in the application of their procedural rules must be balanced against
the ideal of a fair procedure.6' Moreover, deference to state procedural
rules is not predicated on a lack ofpower to entertain a habeas application
when a defendant commits a procedural default in the state courts. 62 The
Court determined, therefore, that the "exigencies of federalism" would be
adequately served by permitting the federal district judge to deny relief to
a petitioner who "deliberately sought to subvert or evade the orderly adju-
dication of his federal defenses in the state courts. ' 63 The Court adopted
the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst64 to
govern the determination of whether the state petitioner had deliberately
57. Id at 399, 432. The Court interpreted the nature of the writ at common law, the
language and purpose of the Act of 1867, and precedent of the Court as being inconsistent
with any limitation of the federal court's power to order a petitioner discharged because of a
procedural forfeiture under state law. Indeed, "federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the
allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may occur in
the state court proceedings. State procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding fed-
eral policy." Id at 426-27.
58. Id at 399, 435. The Court did not disturb the application of the exhaustion doctrine
in cases of presently available state remedies. Id at 435 n.43 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 447-50 (1953)).
59. 372 U.S. at 399.
60. Id. See generally Reitz, supra note 44; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Hart, supra note 44, at
101-21 (discussing the issue of under what circumstances a state procedural default should
bar federal habeas corpus review).
61. 372 U.S. at 431 (quoting Shaeffer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1956)).
62. 372 U.S. at 425 (emphasis in original). The Court has treated the problem of proce-
dural default as "an aspect of the rule requiring exhaustion of state remedies, which is not a
rule distributing power as between the state and federal courts." 1d. By relying on a flexible
discretionary rule that recognizes exceptional circumstances, the Court has refused "to con-
cede jurisdictional significance to an abortive state proceeding." Id at 426.
63. Id at 433, 438.
64. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson furnished the classic definition of waiver-"an inten-
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bypassed the state procedural requirement, thus barring resort to the fed-
eral courts for habeas corpus review. Applying that standard in Noia's
case, the Court found that his failure to appeal could not be deemed a
deliberate bypass of the state court system to justify withholding federal
habeas corpus relief.65
Townsend v. Sain,6 6 the second case of the 1963 trilogy, clarified the con-
siderations that should govern the grant or denial of evidentiary hearings
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that,
in contrast to appellate review, the federal court's function on habeas is "to
test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal
channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations."67
The Court emphasized that because detention obtained in violation of the
Constitution is "intolerable," full plenary review including "the opportu-
nity to be heard to argue, and present evidence, must never be totally fore-
closed."68 Thus, the federal habeas court has de novo power when the
petition presents facts which, if proved, warrant relief.69 Recognizing that
Brown provided insufficient guidelines to govern federal habeas corpus re-
view, the Court set out specific criteria under which an evidentiary hearing
is mandatory. 70
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege". Id. at 464. See Noia,
372 U.S. at 439.
The Court in Noia reasoned that no other rule was required, because a man convicted of a
crime has sufficient inducement to do his best to keep his state remedies open and not stake
his interest solely on the outcome of a federal habeas proceeding which may be less advanta-
geous to him than a state court proceeding. 372 U.S. at 433.
65. 372 U.S. at 439. Although Noia chose not to appeal, that choice was deemed not to
be "a merely tactical or strategic litigation step," or a deliberate circumvention of state pro-
cedures, because he was faced with "the grisly choice" of life imprisonment versus the un-
certain result of an appeal that could have led to retrial and imposition of the death
sentence. Id.
66. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
67. Id. at 311-12.
68. Id at 312.
69. d. at 312-13.
70. Id The Court held that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a
habeas applicant, if:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evi-
dence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hear-
ing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313.
In a 1966 amendment to § 2254, Congress codified these principles to provide a qualified
res judicata effect applicable to review by lower federal courts of habeas petitions filed by
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Finally, in Sanders v. United States," the Supreme Court considered the
standards by which a federal court should determine whether to grant a
hearing on a second or successive motion of a federal prisoner under sec-
tion 2255.72 The Court specified that when an application is shown con-
clusively to be without merit, the application should be denied without a
hearing.73  Regardless of prior applications, however, "if a different
ground is presented by a new application" or "if the same ground was
earlier presented but not adjudicated on the merits," a full hearing must be
afforded unless there has been "an abuse of the writ or motion remedy.
74
The criteria established in Noia and Townsend were to govern determina-
tions of abuse.75
Noia, Townsend and Sanders established liberal standards for the exer-
cise of federal habeas corpus review. Thereafter, Kaufman v. United
state prisoners. The 1966 amendment provided that a state court factual determination,
evidenced by "reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless"
the state proceeding is shown to have been deficient in one of eight respects, five of which
substantially resemble Townsend's six criteria. Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976)). For an in depth examination of the Town-
send criteria and the 1966 codification, see Developments, supra note 1, at 1121-48.
71. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
72. Section 2255 requires: "a prompt hearing" on the motion "[u]nless the motion and
the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief
... " 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). The statute also provides, however, that "[t]he sentencing
court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on
behalf of the same prisoner." Id
The federal court may, but is not required to, give controlling weight to the denial of a
prior application only if: "(I) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was
determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination
was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of
the subsequent application." 373 U.S. at 15. Congress codified these principles in 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 1, 80 Stat. 1104 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1976)). See
S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3663-64. For a detailed discussion of Sanders and the 1966 "codification," see Developments,
supra note 1, at 1149-54.
73. 373 U.S. at 15.
74. ld at 17.
75. We need not pause over the test governing whether a second or successive
application may be deemed an abuse by the prisoner of the writ or motion remedy.
The Court's recent opinions in Fay v. Noia. . . and Townsend v. Sain. . . deal at
length with the circumstances under which a prisoner may be foreclosed from fed-
eral collateral relief. The principles developed in those decisions govern equally
here.
Id at 18.
In 1976, Congress amended Rule 9 of the rules governing § 2254 cases to permit the judge
to dismiss a second or successive petition if the failure of the petitioner to assert new grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 2(8), 90 Stat. 1335
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1976)).
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States" recognized that all constitutional claims are cognizable in a mo-
tion for collateral relief brought by federal prisoners under section 2255.
The Court refuted arguments that expansion of collateral review under
section 2255 undercuts the finality of criminal judgments and is unde-
served because federal prisoners have already appeared before a federal
forum. The Court stated that the prisoner's right is "not merely to a fed-
eral forum" but to the "full and fair consideration of constitutional
claims."" To hold that federal prisoners are less entitled to such consider-
ation than state prisoners would reflect "an anomalous and erroneous view
of federal-state relations.,
78
C The Emergence of "Cause" and "Prejudice" as the Standard for
Excusing Procedural Defaults
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States7 9 prefaced a
new era in the forfeiture of habeas corpus review due to procedural de-
faults in the state courts. In Davis, the Court considered whether a federal
prisoner could challenge the composition of the grand jury in a section
2255 motion. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a de-
fendant to raise "defenses and objections based on defects in the indict-
ment" by motion before trial.8 ' The defendant is otherwise deemed to
have waived the challenge except for "cause shown."'" Although Davis
did not make a Rule 12 motion, he sought to set aside his conviction under
section 2255, alleging unconstitutional discrimination in the grand jury
composition. 2
In denying section 2255 relief, the Court asserted that Congress could
not have intended to negate the purpose of Rule 12 by permitting a more
76. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Kaufman allowed collateral review for search and seizure
claims of federal prisoners and is generally cited as the federal counterpart of Brown P. Allen.
See, e.g., Developments, supra note 1, at 1066. The Kaufman Court assumed that state pris-
oners had the right to collateral review of search and seizure claims, stating: "Our decisions
leave no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial." 394 U.S. at 225. Seven
years later, the Court rejected this dictum. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.16 (1976).
77. 394 U.S. at 228.
78. Id The Court observed that in a proper case, the federal court may deny relief to
one who "deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided at or before trial
and by way of appeal." Id at 227 n.8.
79. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
80. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) (as amended Apr. 22, 1974).
81. Id. The "cause shown" provision for relief from waiver is now set out in subdivi-
sion (f) of the Rule, as provided by a 1974 amendment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) (as amended
Apr. 22, 1974).
82. 411 U.S. at 234-36.
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liberal requirement of waiver in federal habeas proceedings.83 Rather,
congressional adoption of Rule 12(b)(2) provided, in effect, that once a
claim is waived under Rule 12, it may not be resurrected in federal habeas
proceedings without a showing of cause as required by the Rule.84 The
Court also endorsed the district court's requirement that the petitioner
demonstrate actual prejudice.85
Francis v. Henderson86 extended the Davis rule to untimely challenges
by state prisoners to an allegedly unconstitutional grand jury composition.
The petitioner in Francis failed to object before trial to the composition of
the grand jury that indicted him, as required by Louisiana state law to
prevent waiver of the objection on appeal.87 Although Francis did not ap-
peal his conviction, he sought collateral relief on the ground that blacks
had been unconstitutionally excluded from the grand jury. In reversing
the district court's grant of the writ, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that under Davis the state waiver provision must be
given effect unless there is a showing of actual prejudice.88
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that considerations of comity and
federalism require a federal court to give effect to the state interests pro-
tected by timely procedures.89 The Court asserted that the vindication and
protection of federal rights and interests, while important, must not "un-
duly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."9 Because differ-
ential treatment for state and federal prisoners is undesirable,9 ' the Court
held that Davis requires a showing of cause for the state prisoner's failure
to challenge the composition of the grand jury before trial. The Court
83. Id at 242. The Court refused to apply the Noia deliberate bypass waiver standard,
as it indicated in Kaufman that it might, see supra note 78, to a federal prisoner's challenge
to the composition of the grand jury which indicted him, and to which he had not objected
at trial or on appeal. 411 U.S. at 242. The Court distinguished Kaufman as having been
decided upon the statutory basis of § 2255, and not on the basis of the express waiver provi-
sion of Rule 12(b)(2). Id at 240.
84. Id at 242. The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1963), in which it held that a claim of unconstitutional grand
jury composition raised four years after conviction, but while the appeal was still pending,
was governed by Rule 12(b)(2), and was therefore waived for failure to raise the issue by
pretrial motion without a showing of cause for the failure. 411 U.S. at 238-41.
85. Id at 245.
86. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
87. Id at 537.
88. Id
89. Id at 538-39. The Court did not question the federal court's power to entertain a
writ of habeas corpus. Id
90. Id at 541-42 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
91. Id See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 228.
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specifically required a showing of actual prejudice.9 2 Although Francis
seemed to overrule or sharply limit Fay v. Noia,9 at least with reference to
failures to object to grand jury composition, the Noia deliberate bypass
standard was not discussed by the Francis Court.
Wainwright v. Sykes94 resolved whatever doubts lingered after Davis
and Francis concerning the continued application of Noia's knowing and
deliberate bypass exception. The Supreme Court rejected Noia's deliber-
ate bypass standard in favor of the more stringent cause and actual
prejudice standard for excusing a state procedural default.
Sykes sought habeas corpus relief under section 2254 claiming that cer-
tain statements admitted at his trial were inadmissible because he did not
understand his Miranda warnings." Florida's contemporaneous objection
rule required that a defendant's confession be challenged at trial.96 Al-
though Sykes had not raised the Miranda claim prior to his petition for
habeas review, the federal district court granted habeas relief, finding that
only exceptional circumstances of "strategic decisions at trial" can bar fed-
eral constitutional claims in a habeas action.97 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Sykes' failure to
object was not a trial tactic and, therefore, not a deliberate bypass.98
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Sykes' failure to comply with
the state's contemporaneous objection rule was governed not by Noia, but
by the Davis and Francis requirement of cause and actual prejudice.99 Al-
though the Court did not expressly overrule Noia, it rejected Noia's sweep-
ing language that applied the deliberate bypass standard not only to the
waiver of the right to appeal, but also to failures to raise individual sub-
stantive objections in the state trial court.'0 °
The Sykes Court rejected the deliberate bypass waiver standard for sev-
92. 425 U.S. at 542. The Court concluded that the Davis ruling applied to a habeas
corpus proceeding seeking to overturn a state-court conviction on the grounds of an alleg-
edly unconstitutional grand jury indictment. Id. "[Tihe interest in finality is the same with
regard to both federal and state prisoners." Id (quoting Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 228).
93. 372 U.S. 391. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
94. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id at 76.
97. Id (referring to the unpublished order of Jan. 23, 1975 of the District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, discussed in Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 523-24 (5th Cir.
1976)).
98. 528 F.2d at 527. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Davis on the basis that no
prejudice was shown from the failure to object, whereas prejudice is "inherent" where the
admissibility of an incriminating statement is concerned. Id at 526-27.
99. 433 U.S. at 87.
100. Id at 87-88.
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eral reasons. First, the Court found that state contemporaneous objection
rules deserve greater respect than was afforded by Noia, because they are
employed by a judicial branch of coordinate jurisdiction within the federal
system, and because of the many interests such rules serve in their own
right.'l ' These interests include the enhancement of finality of criminal
judgments, increasing judicial efficiency, and promoting the perception of
the trial as the main event. 102 Second, Noia served to undercut these inter-
ests by encouraging "sandbagging" on the part of defense attorneys "who
may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with
the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if
their initial gamble does not pay off.' 0 3
The Court emphasized that the cause and actual prejudice requirement
would apply only when the state court had not reached the merits of the
federal claim because of the petitioner's procedural default. "0 The cause
and prejudice standard would not, however, preclude federal habeas re-
view if a "miscarriage of justice" would result.0 5
Applying the cause and actual prejudice requirement to the facts of this
case, the Court concluded that Sykes had forfeited his right to federal
habeas review, having demonstrated neither cause for his procedural de-
fault, nor actual prejudice. Sykes failed to demonstrate cause for his fail-
ure to comply with state procedure, the Court observed, because he had
"advanced no explanation whatever for his failure to object at trial."' 10 6
Actual prejudice was absent because the substantial evidence of guilt
presented at Sykes' trial negated any prejudice that resulted from the ad-
mission of the incriminating statements.'0 7 The Court left open "for reso-
101. Id at 88. In Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the Court clarified a
limitation on the extent to which Sykes requires federal courts to observe state procedural
requirements as a bar to federal habeas corpus review. The Court held that since the pur-
pose behind Sykes is "to accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our
federal system," when the state does not invoke its own procedures, the federal court "im-
plies no disrespect" in refusing to impose the state procedural default to bar habeas corpus
review. Id at 155.
102. 433 U.S. at 88-90. Contemporaneous objection at trial ensures that the constitu-
tional claim is preserved on the record when witnesses' memories are freshest, or is resolved
by the judge who is able to observe the witnesses' demeanor. A contemporaneous objection
may also lead to the exclusion of challenged evidence and ensure that the trial is as error free
as possible. Id
103. Id at 89.
104. Id at 87. Thus, the Court preserved the rule of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953),
permitting the federal habeas court to make an independent determination of the merits of
the state petitioner's federal claim 433 U.S. at 87.





lution in future decisions the precise definition of the cause and prejudice
standard," noting only that it is narrower than the dicta of Noia.0 8
II. IMPLEMENTING SYKES AND FEDERAL HABEAS RESTRAINT
The Supreme Court's current position on federal habeas corpus is une-
quivocal: liberal availability of the federal habeas corpus remedy must
yield to considerations of comity, federalism, and finality of judgments.
Accordingly, total exhaustion of state remedies is required under the rule
enunciated in Rose v. Lundy.'" The Sykes cause and actual prejudice
standard for excusing procedural defaults is to apply to cases in which the
constitutional error may have affected the truthfinding function at trial, as
determined in Engle v. Isaac. " Finally, after United States v. Frady,"'
the cause and actual prejudice requirement governs petitions of federal
prisoners under section 2255.
A. Rose v. Lundy: Total Exhaustion is the Rule
The Supreme Court in Lundy adopted a per se rule requiring federal
district courts to dismiss all habeas corpus petitions containing claims that
have not been exhausted in the state courts." 12 Lundy was convicted by a
jury of rape and a crime against nature. After an unsuccessful appeal, the
state supreme court denied review. Lundy's petition for state collateral
relief was also denied. Subsequently, Lundy filed a petition in the federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254, alleging both
exhausted and unexhausted claims." 3 The Supreme Court noted that al-
108. Id at 87.
109. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Bren-
nan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Marshall
joined; Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion).
110. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982) (Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined).
111. 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982) (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall took no part in
consideration or decision of this case; Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion; Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion).
112. 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
113. Id. Lundy alleged four grounds for relief:
(1) that he had been denied the right to confrontation because the trial court lim-
ited the defense counsel's questioning of the victim; (2) that he had been denied the
right to a fair trial because the prosecuting attorney stated that the respondent had
a violent character; (3) that he had been denied the right to a fair trial because the
prosecutor improperly remarked in his closing argument that the State's evidence
was uncontradicted; and (4) that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that
every witness is presumed to swear the truth.
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though the district court had determined that it could not consider the
unexhausted claims "in the constitutional framework," the court referred
to those claims collaterally "in assessing the atmosphere" of the trial." 4
The district court also entertained several allegations of prosecutorial mis-
conduct that had neither been challenged in the state courts nor raised in
Lundy's habeas petition. The district court concluded that Lundy had not
received a fair trial" 5 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed." 16
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a dis-
trict court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and
exhausted claims. ' 17 The Court reviewed prior Supreme Court cases in-
volving the exhaustion doctrine"' and noted that none had applied the
Lundy had not exhausted his state remedies for claims three and four. Id
114. Id at 1199-1200. The Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals had ruled specifically
on grounds one and two, holding that although the trial court erred in restricting cross-
examination of the victim and the prosecuting attorney improperly alluded to the respon-
dent's violent nature, the respondent was not prejudiced by these errors. Lundy v. State, 521
S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
115. 102 S. Ct. at 1200.
116. Lundy v. Rose, 624 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1980) (decision without published opinion).
117. 102 S. Ct. at 1205. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits had adopted a "total exhaustion"
rule requiring that mixed petitions presenting unexhausted and exhausted claims must be
dismissed for failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355-60 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 808-10 (9th Cir. 1976). A majority of
circuits, however, permitted the district courts to review the exhausted claims in a mixed
petition. See, e.g., Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980); United States ex rel.
Tratino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 91-98 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978);
Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976); Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134, 137 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir.
1973); Brown v. Wisconsin State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 457 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36, 39 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'don
other grounds, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir.
1969).
118. In developing its policy arguments, the Court relied upon Exparte Royall, 117 U.S.
241, 251 (1886) (holding that as a matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a
claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an opportunity to act);
Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (reiterating that comity was the basis for the ex-
haustion doctrine); and Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). See also supra note 47.
The Court in Lundy noted that the exhaustion requirement "serves to minimize friction
between our federal and state systems ofjustice." 102 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Duckworth v.
Serrano, 102 S. Ct. 18, 19 (1981)). In Duckworth, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel for the first time in the court of appeals, which reversed the district court's dismis-
sal of his habeas corpus petition because his attorney's representation of a prosecution wit-
ness constituted a per se violation of the sixth amendment guarantee of effective
representation. The Court declined to create an exception to the exhaustion requirement for
clear constitutional violations, noting that "obvious constitutional errors, no less than ob-
scure transgressions," are subject to the [exhaustion] requirement of § 2254(b)." Duckworth,
102 S. Ct. at 19.
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doctrine to habeas petitions presenting both exhausted and unexhausted
claims." 9 The Court also found that the legislative history of section 2254
contained no reference to the problem of mixed petitions. 20  Conse-
quently, the Court examined the underlying policy considerations in-
volved, relying on precedent and notions of federalism.' 2 ' Noting that
state and federal courts are equally bound to uphold the Constitution,'
22
the Court recognized the well-established policy that state courts must be
given the first opportunity to consider the constitutional claims of state
prisoners.' 23 The adoption of a total exhaustion requirement would not
only ensure that state prisoners initially seek relief in the state courts, but
would also enhance the state courts' familiarity with constitutional
issues. 124
The plurality asserted that the total exhaustion requirement will not im-
pair prompt federal relief of the state prisoner's claims.1 25 If the petitioner
elects not to return to state court to exhaust all his claims, he can choose to
amend his petition by deleting the unexhausted claims.' 26 If, however, the
petitioner elects to delete the unexhausted claims, he could be barred from
federal habeas review of those claims in a subsequent petition. 27 Under
119. 102 S. Ct. at 1202.
120. Under § 2254 a remedy is not exhausted if a state procedure exists to raise "the
question presented." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); supra note 47. The Court found "this phrase
to be too ambiguous to sustain the conclusion that Congress intended to either permit or
prohibit rview of mixed petitions." 102 S. Ct. at 1202.
121. Id at 1203 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 490-91
(1973)). See also Developments, supra note 1, at 1094.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. at 25 1). See supra notes 47 &
118.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)) (see supra
note 47); Duckworth v. Serrano, 102 S. Ct. 18 (1981) (per curiam) (see supra note 118). See
also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). In Picard, the Court upheld the requirement
that a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, adding that, for the exhaustion
requirement to be satisfied, "the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be
presented to the state courts." Id at 278 (emphasis added).
124. 102 S. Ct. at 1203. In addition, the Court reasoned that total exhaustion will pro-
vide a more complete factual record for the federal courts to review, and will relieve the
district court of the difficult task of deciding when exhausted and unexhausted claims are
interrelated. 102 S. Ct. at 1204. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) (requiring a federal court
reviewing a habeas petition to presume as correct factual findings made by a state court).
125. 102 S. Ct. at 1204. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. at 490
(recognizing that the exhaustion doctrine is "a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a
careful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ
of habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in the cases of illegal restraint or confine-
ment.' ") (citation omitted).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
127. Id
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the plurality's interpretation of Sanders'28 and Rule 9(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, 29 the plurality suggested that a fed-
eral district court may dismiss the subsequent petition of a state prisoner
who proceeds only with his exhausted claims and "deliberately" sets aside
his unexhausted claims.'
30
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the
plurality's adoption of a total exhaustion rule.' 3' Instead, he would have
adopted the approach of the majority of circuits, permitting review of the
exhausted claims of a mixed petition. 3 2 Without disputing the value of
comity, Justice Blackmun argued that a "total exhaustion" rule could be
"read into" section 2254(b) and (c) "only by sheer force."' 33 Allowing fed-
128. The plurality referred to the following passage from Sanders:
[I]f a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief
at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings
rather than one or for some other such reason he may be deemed to have waived
his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. The
same may be true if, as in Wong Doo, the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his
grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires
the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral
proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
102 S. Ct. at 1205 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963)). In Wong Doo v.
United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924), the petitioner sought release from custody of a deporta-
tion order. He brought two habeas petitions, each containing the same ground for relief.
The Court held that, because the petitioner "had full opportunity to offer proof' in the first
hearing, the lower court should not consider the second petition. 265 U.S. at 241. The Court
in Lundy noted that Wong Doo did not control "because the respondent could not have
litigated his unexhausted claims in federal court," but that the case provides guidance for the
situation where a prisoner deliberately elects not to exhaust his claims in state court. 102 S.
Ct. at 1205 n.13.
129. See supra note 42. The plurality noted "that Rule 9(b) incorporates the judge-made
principle governing the abuse of the writ set forth in Sanders." 102 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (citing
Advisory Committee Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)).
130. 102 S. Ct. at 1205. Having decided the case on the grounds of exhaustion, the Court
did not reach the petitioner's claims that the grounds offered by the respondent did not merit
habeas relief. 1d at n.14.
131. 102 S. Ct. at 1205 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Id See supra note 117.
133. 102 S. Ct. at 1205. Justice Blackmun noted that "neither the language nor the legis-
lative history of [these provisions] mandates the dismissal" of mixed habeas petitions. Id at
1206. He also disagreed that precedent dictated the Court's result. He asserted that, with
regard to the respondent's arguments concerning the trial court's restriction upon cross-ex-
amination of the victim and some of the prosecutor's allegedly improper comments, the
respondent had complied with Picard's directive that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied
upon a fair presentation of the federal claim to state courts. Id (citing Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). See supra note 123. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun noted, the
Court's precedents suggest that "the state courts need not inevitably be given every opportu-
nity to safeguard a prisoner's constitutional rights and to provide him relief before a federal
court may entertain his habeas petition." Id at 1206 (footnote omitted).
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eral district courts to rule on the exhausted claims of mixed petitions while
dismissing the unexhausted claims is consistent, he asserted, with the
Court's concern for comity. 134 The state courts would have occasion to rule
first on every constitutional challenge, having ample opportunity to correct
any constitutional error before federal habeas review.' 35 He concluded
that the decision to entertain the exhausted claims should be left to the
discretion of the federal judge. 1
36
Justice Blackmun also argued that the plurality's interest in "efficient
administration of the federal courts" militates against a total exhaustion
requirement. 37 The federal court must review the record initially to deter-
mine whether all claims have been exhausted and must do so again when
the petitioner resubmits the previously unexhausted claims.' 38 In many
cases, the federal court could easily dispose of the case on the merits in the
initial review, and in other cases, the court might not realize that one or
more of the claims is unexhausted until substantial work is done.'
39
Finally, Justice Blackmun expressed the fear that state prisoners might
not be treated uniformly under the total exhaustion requirement. 4o If the
petitioner is unaware that he may amend his petition, the opportunity to
amend may depend upon a court's willingness to inform him of that
right.' 4 ' He may be required to refile the petition, thus incurring substan-
134. Id at 1206-07. Justice Blackmun argued that in some respects the Court's ruling
was "more destructive than solicitious of federal-state comity." A patently frivolous claim
will be dismissed, only to be rejected on the merits by the state court after expenditure of its
time and resources, receiving little, if any, consideration in the subsequent federal habeas
proceeding. Id. at 1207.
135. Id. at 1205-07. Justice Blackmun contended that allowing district courts to rule on
the exhausted claims of mixed petitions ensures that a § 2254 petition is accompanied by a
complete factual record. Id. at 1207. He disagreed that the issue of interrelated claims must
be resolved by a total exhaustion requirement, because federal courts have had no difficulty
addressing the issue and have always been free to dismiss the entire petition if the exhausted
claim depended upon resolution of the unexhausted claim. Id. (citing Miller v. Hall, 536
F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. McBride v. Fay, 370 F.2d 547, 548 (2d
Cir. 1966)).
136. 102 S. Ct. at 1207, 1210.
137. Id. at 1208.
138. Id.
139. Id. Justice Blackmun expressed the additional concern that delay occasioned by the
total exhaustion requirement is likely to result in a stale record of the exhausted grounds,
making resolution of the merits more difficult. Id (footnote omitted) (citing United States
ex rel. Irving v. Casscles, 448 F.2d 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 925 (1973);
United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. Mancusi, 380 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1967), which re-
sulted in a delay of years before a federal court judgment was obtained on the merits of the
exhausted claims following dismissal of the mixed habeas petitions).
140. 102 S. Ct. at 1209-10.
141. 1d. at 1210.
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tial delay.' 42
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined with the plurality in all but the
view regarding forfeiture of the petitioner's unexhausted claims.' 43 To
hold that previously unexhausted claims may be dismissed as an "abuse"
when resubmitted in a subsequent petition misreads Sanders, they as-
serted, which requires a knowing and deliberate choice to forego inclusion
of all claims in a first petition "in order to get more than 'one bite at the
apple.'""" Justices Brennan and Marshall contended that there can be no
abuse of the writ when petitioner's abandonment of his unexhausted claim
is not deliberate in the Sanders sense because the federal court refused to
entertain a mixed petition. '45 Similarly, the petitioner does not "abandon"
his unexhausted claim when he is not permitted to proceed.'46
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, criticized the plurality's "inflexible,
mechanical rule" as an arbitrary denial of the opportunity of district
judges to administer their calendars effectively.'47 Calling the writ of
habeas corpus "a fundamental guarantee of liberty,"' 48 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the availability of habeas corpus relief should not depend upon
the procedural history underlying the prisoner's claim, but upon the char-
acter of the alleged constitutional violation. " Rather, those errors which
make a trial fundamentally unfair demand immediate relief despite the
142. Id
143. Id at 1210-11 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. Id at 1212. Justice Brennan noted that in promulgating Rule 9(b), Congress re-
jected the proposed words, "not excusable," in favor of, "constituted an abuse of the writ,"
because the former language "gave ajudge too broad a discretion to dismiss a second or suces-
sivepetition." Id at 1211 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2482, 2485). The House Judiciary Committee be-
lieved that the change to the "abuse" language "would bring Rule 9(b) into conformity with
existing law." 102 S. Ct. at 1211 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1471, supra, at 5, U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, supra, at 2482).
145. Id at 1213.
146. 1d
147. 102 S. Ct. at 1213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 1218.
149. Id at 1215-16. In Justice Stevens' opinion, there are four types of claims of consti-
tutional error:
[I.] [A] claim that attaches a constitutional label to a set of facts that does not
disclose a violation of any constitutional right. . . . [2.] constitutional violations
that are not of sufficient import in a particular case to justify reversal even on direct
appeal, when the evidence is still fresh and a fair retrial could be promptly con-
ducted. . . [3.] errors that are important enough to require reversal on direct ap-
peal but do not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness to the accused that will
support a collateral attack on a final judgment. . . . [and] [4.] those errors that are
so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or




procedural history. 50 In this case, for example, if the prisoner were inno-
cent and the trial was fundamentally unfair, postponing relief until an-
other round of review in the state and federal judicial systems is completed
would require the aggrieved prisoner to remain in jail because of a plead-
ing error.' 5 ' Justice Stevens would allow district judges to exercise their
discretion in determining whether the existence of an unexhausted claim
makes it inappropriate to consider the merits of a properly pleaded ex-
hausted claim. 52
B. Engle v. Isaac. No "Cause" to Complain
In Engle v. Isaac,'53 the Supreme Court extended the Sykes cause and
actual prejudice standard for excusing the procedural defaults of state peti-
tioners to claims of error that may have affected the determination of guilt
at trial. Isaac was convicted of aggravated assault under an Ohio statute"'
that had been interpreted by the courts to require the defendant to carry
the burden of proving self-defense.' 55 The trial court instructed the jury
that this burden must be met by a preponderence of the evidence. Isaac
was convicted on the basis of that interpretation, but one year later the
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the statute to place only the burden of
production, not the burden of persuasion, on the accused.' 5 6
150. Id at 1217. Justice Stevens cited several "classic grounds" of error that would sup-
port issuance of the writ and illustrate the fourth category: "that the proceeding was domi-
nated by mob violence," id. (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)); "that the
prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony,") 102 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)) or "that the conviction was based on a confession extorted
from the defendant by brutal means," 102 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (direct appeal)). 102 S. Ct. at 1216-17.
151. 102 S. Ct. at 1217. In Justice Stevens' view, however, the respondent's exhausted
claims fell within the first category of claimed constitutional error. Id. at 1216. See supra
note 149.
152. 102 S. Ct. at 1217.
153. 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982). Isaac was a consolidation of three cases also reviewing the
claims of respondents Hughes and Bell. For purposes of clarity, this Comment refers only to
claims and proceedings concerning the respondent Isaac.
154. "Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of
going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused." OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (1975). The jury acquitted Isaac of felonious assault, but con-
victed him of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. 102 S. Ct. at 1564 (citing
State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977)).
155. The Supreme Court noted that the Ohio courts had required for over a century that
criminal defendants carry the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. 102 S. Ct. at 1562. Most Ohio courts assumed that § 2901.05(A) effected no
change in Ohio's traditional burden-of-proof rules. See 102 S. Ct. at 1563 n.2 and cases
cited therein.
156. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976) (holding that when self-
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On appeal, Isaac relied upon the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation to
challenge the burden of proof instructions given at his trial. The Ohio
Court of Appeals denied Isaac's appeal because he had failed to object to
the jury instructions during trial as required by Ohio Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30, a default that waived Isaac's claim. 57 The Supreme Court
of Ohio dismissed Isaac's appeal for lack of. a substantial constitutional
question. 1
58
In his petition, Isaac alleged that the Ohio Supreme Court had failed to
give him relief despite its own pronouncement that the new construction of
Ohio's affirmative defense statute would apply retroactively. 59 Isaac also
claimed that the ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court was "contrary to the
Supreme Court of the United States in regard to proving self-defense."'
' 60
The district court determined that Isaac had waived any constitutional
claims by failing to present them to the state trial court. Because he failed
to show either cause for or actual prejudice from the waiver, federal
habeas review was precluded.161 In an en banc decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that Wainwright v. Sykes did
not preclude consideration of Isaac's constitutional claims.' 62 The court
noted that at the time of Isaac's trial, defendants were consistently required
to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
the futility of objecting to this established practice constituted adequate
cause for Isaac's waiver. Secondly, prejudice was" 'clear' since the burden
defense is raised and some evidence produced, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt) (syllabus by the court).
157. 102 S. Ct. at 1565. At the time of Isaac's trial, OHIO R. CRIM. P. 30 provided that
A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating spe-
cifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportu-
nity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 30. This Rule closely parallels FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. See 102 S. Ct. at
1565 n.15.
158. Id (citing State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977)). On the same day, the
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that every criminal trial held on or after Jan. 1, 1974 was to be
conducted in accordance with Ohio's affirmative self-defense statute. Id (citing State v.
Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354, 1355 (1977)). This decision was not ex-
tended to a defendant who had not complied with OHio R. CRIM. P. 30. 102 S. Ct. at 1565
(citing Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d at 102-03, 364 N.E.2d at 1359). Also on the same day, the
Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Williams, in which the court rejected a constitutional
challenge to Ohio's traditional self-defense instruction because the defendant had failed to
object to the instruction at trial. 102 S. Ct. at 1565 (citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d
112, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U.S. 911 (1978)).
159. 102 S. Ct. at 1566 (citing Isaac v. Engle, No. C-2-78-278 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 1978)).
160. Id See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. 102 S. Ct. at 1566 (citing Isaac v. Engle, No. C-2-78-278 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 1978)).
162. 102 S. Ct. at 1566 (citing Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir. 1980)).
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of proof is a critical element of factfinding," and Isaac had emphasized the
issue of self-defense. 6 3 A majority of the court also believed that the in-
structions given at Isaac's trial violated due process.' 64
The Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof argument
stated a colorable constitutional claim.'65 Nevertheless, the claim had not
been preserved before the state courts, as required by Ohio Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 30. The Court then determined that Issac could not litigate
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding a constitutional claim that he for-
feited before the state courts.
16 6
At the outset, the Court noted that although the writ of habeas corpus is
"a bulwark against convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness,' "167 the
writ also "entails significant CoStS.' 168 Reviewing the considerations that
supported its decision in Sykes, 169 the Court stated that collateral review
163. Id
164. Id
165. 102 S. Ct. at 1568. The Court first dismissed respondent's argument that § 2901.05
"implicitly designated absence of self-defense as an element of the crimes charged against
them" on the basis of their interpretation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that
juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when
they are charged with violation of a criminal law). 102 S. Ct. at 1567. See also Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that a New York law requiring a defendant in a
prosecution for second-degree murder to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the af-
firmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the crime to manslaughter
does not violate due process when the affirmative defense does not negate any facts of the
crime which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975) (holding that a Maine statute requiring a defendant charged with murder to
prove that he acted in the heat of passion or sudden provocation does not comport with due
process requirement that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged). The Court specified that these decisions "do not
suggest that whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that circumstance as an element of the
crime." Furthermore, the state need not treat absence of an affirmative defense as an ele-
ment of the crime for all purposes. 102 S. Ct. at 1567. The Court noted that several courts
had applied Mullaney and Patterson to require, on constitutional grounds that the prosecu-
tion prove absence of self-defense. Id (citing Tenon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.
1981); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981);
Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); Common-
wealth v. Hilbert, 476 Pa. 288, 382 A.2d 724 (1978)).
166. 102 S. Ct. at 1570. The Court distinguished the problem of waiver from the ques-
tion whether a state prisoner has exhausted state remedies. The exhaustion requirement
applies only to those remedies available in the courts of the state. Id. at 1570 n.28 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976)). Isaac had exhausted state remedies because he had long ago com-
pleted his direct appeal. Id. In addition, Ohio's limited collateral review of convictions
which was not available to Isaac because he did not litigate his claim before judgment or on
direct appeal. Id (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A) (1975)).
167. 102 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977)).
168. 102 S. Ct. at 1571.
169. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
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of a criminal conviction "extends the ordeal of trial for both society and
the accused," thereby undermining finality of litigation. 7 ' "Liberal allow-
ance of the writ . . . degrades the prominence of the trial itself," sug-
gesting to trial participants that it is unnecessary to adhere to the legal and
constitutional safeguards afforded the accused during trial. 7 '
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, habeas corpus may "cost society the
right to punish admitted offenders," because "[p]assage of time, erosion of
memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult," if not
impossible. 7 2 The Court noted that the writ imposes "special costs" on
our federal system, permitting federal intrusions upon the states' sovereign
power to administer their criminal justice systems and their "good faith
attempts to honor constitutional rights."' 73 Finally, the Court asserted
that when a prisoner is barred by procedural default from obtaining adju-
dication of his constitutional claim in the state courts, "the trial court has
had no opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials."
Issuance of the writ in such cases undermines the states' procedural
rules.' 74 Finding that these "costs" are not lessened by the nature of the
constitutional claim alleged, the Court refused to limit the Sykes cause and
actual prejudice standard to cases in which the constitutional error has not
affected the truthfinding function of the trial. 75
In applying the cause and actual prejudice standard, the Isaac Court
first ruled that "the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts
cannot alone constitute cause for a failure to object at trial," even if the
state court has previously rejected that constitutional argument. 76 The
170. 102 S. Ct. at 1571 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See also Bator, supra note 3, at 452; Friendly, supra note 3, at 146.
171. 102 S. Ct. at 1571. Society's resources are invested in the criminal trial, the Court
noted, to determine the question of guilt or innocence at that time and place. Id. (quoting
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90).
172. 102 S. Ct. at 1571.
173. Id Noting that our "constitutional jurisprudence has recognized numerous new
rights for criminal defendants" over the past two decades, the Court commented that state
courts are "understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law
only to have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitutional com-
mands." Id at 1571-72 n.33. Over an extended period of time, the Court continued, "fed-
eral intrusions may seriously undermine the morale of our state judges," and thereby
"diminish the fervor of state judges to root out constitutional errors on their own." Id
174. 102 S. Ct. at 1572. While counsel's default "may stem from simple ignorance or the
pressures of trial . . . a defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a claim in
order to 'sandbag'-to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gam-
ble doesn't pay off." Id. at 1572 n.34 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90).
175. 102 S. Ct. at 1572.
176. Id at 1572-73 n.35 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976)) ("the policy
disfavoring inferred waivers of constitutional rights need not be carried to the length of
allowing counsel for a defendant deliberately to forego objection to a curable trial defect,
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claim must be presented to the state court to permit the court to decide if
the contention is valid.'77 In addition, the Court asserted, allowing crimi-
nal defendants to deprive the state courts of the opportunity to consider
constitutional arguments before they are presented to the federal court vio-
lates the principles of Sykes.
178
The Court then addressed Isaac's argument that a criminal defendant
may not waive due process claims unknown at the time of his trial. 7 9 The
Court chose not to decide "whether the novelty of a constitutional claim
ever establishes cause for a failure to object,"' 0 declining to adopt a rule
that would require trial counsel to "exercise extraordinary vision" or to
object at every instance that "might mask a latent constitutional claim.""'
Furthermore, the Court noted, the original trial need not be rendered fun-
damentally unfair by subsequent discovery of a latent constitutional
error. 182
The Court did not have to determine whether novelty constituted cause
in Isaac's case because his claims were cognizable at the time of his trial.
Several defendants had relied upon In re Winship 183 to challenge the con-
stitutionality of burden of proof rules.' 84 Although recognizing that not
every astute counsel would have relied upon Winship, the Court held that
"[wihere the basis of the constitutional claim is available, and other de-
fense counsel have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of com-
ity and finality counsel against labeling alleged unawareness of the
objection as cause for a procedural default."'8 5 Having had "the tools" to
even though he is aware of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he
thought objection would be futile.").
177. 102 S. Ct. at 1573.
178. Id The Court likened this result to a decision to withhold a known constitutional
claim resembling the type of deliberate bypass disavowed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), which is an even less demanding standard than cause and actual prejudice. 102 S. Ct.
at 1573 n.36.
179. Id at 1573.
180. 102 S. Ct. at 1572 (footnote omitted).
181. Id (footnote omitted).
182. Id (footnote omitted).
183. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the due process clause precludes convictions
"except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged"). See supra note 165.
184. 102 S. Ct. at 1513. The Court noted that Isaac also had the benefit of the Court's
opinion in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), see infra note 165, decided three months
before his trial, in which the Court "explicitly acknowledged the link between Winship, and
constitutional limits on assignment of the burden of proof." Id at 1574 n.42. Furthermore,
"[elven those decisions rejecting the defendant's claim ...show that the issue had been
perceived by other defendants . . . and was a live [issue] in the courts at the time." Id at
1574 n.41.
185. Id at 1574-75 (footnote omitted).
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construct his constitutional argument, Isaac failed to demonstrate cause for
his failure to object at trial. 186 The Court did not consider the question of
actual prejudice since Isaac failed to demonstrate cause for his procedural
default. 1
87
The Court asserted that cause and actual prejudice are not rigid con-
cepts, but "take their meaning from the principles of comity and final-
ity. '  Although in appropriate cases, the principles of cause and
prejudice "must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally unjust incar-
ceration," the Court maintained "that victims of a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard."' 89
In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall objected to the Court's "ea-
gerness to expatiate" upon the "significant costs" of habeas corpus, which
led it to misread Isaac's claim for habeas relief.'9° They contended that
Isaac's habeas petition presented only one claim, which did not exist until
his last direct appeal was denied. Thus, they concluded, there was no
claim to preserve, and because Isaac committed no procedural default,
Sykes was inapplicable.''
Justice Brennan vigorously asserted that the majority's decision could
not withstand the Sykes Court's reasoning.'92 Sykes adopted the cause
and prejudice standard to promote "greater respect" for state contempora-
neous objection rules than was assertedly provided by Noia.19 Contem-
poraneous objection rules (1) enable the record of the constitutional claim
to be made when witnesses' memories are 'freshest, (2) assist the presiding
judge in properly deciding the federal constitutional question based on his
observation of witness demeanor, (3) lead to the exclusion of challenged
186. Id at 1574.
187. Id at 1575 n.43. Isaac argued "that [his] prejudice was so great that it should per-
mit relief even in the absence of cause." Id. The Court rejected this argument, noting that
Sykes "stated these criteria in the conjunctive" and that the facts of Isaac's case did not
warrant a departure from that position. In Justice Stevens' view, however, both the cause
and the actual prejudice prongs should involve an inquiry into fundamental fairness. Id at
1576 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case, the Court
applied the cause prong without relating its application to the fairness of Isaac's trial. Jus-
tice Stevens would not apply this standard to bar habeas corpus relief "simply as a matter of
procedural foreclosure." Id
188. Id at 1575.
189. Id Justice Stevens disputed the Court's "preoccupation with procedural hurdles"
which, he stated, will complicate rather than simplify the processing of habeas petitions. Id
at 1576. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, he would have
rejected Isaac's claims on the merits. Id
190. Id at 1576 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. Id at 1577.
192. Id at 1580-81.
193. Id at 1580 (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88).
[Vol. 32:169
Habeas Corpus Restraint
evidence, and (4) encourage error free criminal trials. Finally, he ob-
served, Sykes rejected the deliberate bypass standard of Noia which was
thought to encourage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers.' 94
Justice Brennan contended that none of these rationales has force in this
case. The first three are valid only with regard to objections to the admis-
sion of evidence, 95 and the fourth reason is irrelevant to inchoate constitu-
tional claims which are unlikely to contribute to error-free trials. Finally,
he asserted, the sandbagging rationale offends common sense.
196
The dissent also objected to the Court's application of Sykes to cases
involving error affecting the determination of guilt. Applying Sykes to
such claims ignores the "manifest differences" between claims that affect
the truthfinding function of the trial and claims that do not.' 97 Although a
defendant's fourth amendment rights'98 or his Miranda rights' 99 arguably
may be different from other constitutional rights, the entire result of the
trial is untrustworthy when the burden of proof has been unconstitution-
ally allocated. 2" The dissent concluded that even if Sykes is applicable,
"[i]t should not be allowed to insulate from all judicial review all viola-
tions of the most fundamental rights of the accused."' '
C United States v. Frady: Prejudice Requires Actual and
Substantial Disadvantage
The Supreme Court determined in United States v. Frady2 2 that federal,
as well as state prisoners, must demonstrate cause excusing their proce-
194. Id. at 1581 (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-90).
195. Id. at 1581.
196. Id. Additionally, Justice Brennan objected to the Court's claim that "[flederal in-
trusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Id at 1582 (quoting 102 S.
Ct. at 1571-72 n.33). Brennan argued "that the 'intrusion' complained of is that of the
supreme law of the land." 102 S. Ct. at 1582. Furthermore, "[it is inimical to the principle
of federal constitutional supremacy to defer to state courts' 'frustration' at the requirements
of federal constitutional law as it is interpreted in an evolving society." Id.
197. Id.
198. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See supra note 37. See also Friendly,
supra note 3, at 161-64.
199. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See supra notes 94-108 and accompa-
nying text.
200. 102 S. Ct. at 1583. "In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of
proof lies may be decisive of the outcome." Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958)).
201. 102 S. Ct. at 1583.
202. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982). Frady and another defendant were charged with the
murder of Thomas Bennett under circumstances which suggested that Bennett's death was a
contract killing. See id at 1587-88. The victim was brutally beaten to death. Frady de-
fended solely by denying all responsibility for the killing, suggesting that the real murderer
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dural defaults and actual prejudice resulting from the challenged errors.
In 1963, Frady was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder. He was
sentenced to death by a federal district court jury. His conviction was af-
firmed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit set aside the death sentence and resentenced Frady to life
imprisonment. 203 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.2"
In 1979, Frady filed a motion under section 2255 alleging that the jury
instructions given at his 1963 trial were defective because they compelled
the jury to presume malice, and thereby wrongfully eliminated any possi-
bility of a manslaughter verdict in violation of his right to a fair trial.2" 5
Frady argued that cases decided after his trial and appeal had disapproved
instructions identical to those used in his case.206
The district court denied Frady's motion because Frady failed to chal-
lenge the jury instructions on direct appeal or in one of his earlier mo-
tions.2 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, finding the challenged instructions to be plainly errone-
ous under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.208
The appellate court determined that Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,20 9 which requires timely objection, must be read in
conjunction with Rule 52(b), which provides that plain errors affecting
substantial rights may be raised on direct appeal, even though no objection
was raised at trial.210 The court reasoned that since Davis v. United
States t held that "the standard for allowing a section 2255 motion on an
had left the victim's house while the police pursued Frady and the other defendant. Accord-
ingly, Frady raised no justification, excuse or mitigating circumstance. Id at 1588.
203. Id at 1588-89 (citing Frady v. United States (Frady I), 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965)).
204. 102 S. Ct. at 1589. Frady filed four motions to vacate or reduce his sentence in 1965,
and one each in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1978. See United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506, 508
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit directed that Frady's separate sentences for robbery and murder run concur-
rently rather than consecutively. 102 S. Ct. at 1589 n.4 (citing United States v. Frady, 607
F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
205. United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See supra note 25 for perti-
nent language of § 2255.
206. Id Frady relied on United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 455-56 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Green v. United States (Green I), 405 F.2d 1368, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Belton v.
United States, 382 F.2d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See 102 S. Ct. at 1589 n.6.
207. See 102 S. Ct. at 1589-90.
208. United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See supra note 27 for
text of Rule 52(b).
209. "No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
210. Frady, 636 F.2d at 510.
211. 411 U.S. 233, 240-42 (1973). See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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issue not raised at trial should be no less stringent than the standard in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for review on direct appeal," the ap-
propriate standard for review in this case is the plain error standard of
Rule 52(b).212
The court concluded that although the result in this case would be the
same under the cause and prejudice standard set forth in Davis, the Davis
rationale, which applied the requirements of Rule 12(b)(2) on collateral
review, suggested that the "plain error" standard is the appropriate stan-
dard for review of section 2255 motions involving Rule 52(b).213 The
Supreme Court granted the United States government's petition for a writ
of certiorari to review whether the court of appeals properly invoked the
plain error standard in considering Frady's section 2255 motion.
214
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Rule 52(b) provides a means for
the prompt redress of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the rule may
only be invoked on appeal "from a trial infected with error so 'plain' that
the trial judge and prosecutor were 'derelict' in countenancing it," despite
the defendant's failure to object in a timely fashion.215 The Court asserted,
however, that the rule was intended for use solely on direct appeal, and is
inappropriate in motions for collateral relief. Once a defendant has
waived his right to appeal, or his conviction is affirmed, the Court rea-
soned, society has a legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment "per-
fected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct review or by the
affirmance of the conviction on appeal.,
216
The Court found that the District of Columbia Circuit improperly inter-
preted the Davis statement that "no more lenient standard of waiver
should apply" on collateral attack than on direct review, to mean "no more
stringent," and thereby incorrectly applied the "plain error" standard to
collateral review of Frady's motion, despite precedent holding that a col-
lateral challenge may not substitute for an appeal.21 7 Having waived or
exhausted the chance to appeal, the Court stated, the defendant is pre-
212. 636 F.2d at 510.
213. Id n.9.
214. 102 S. Ct. at 1590. The Court first dismissed an objection by Frady to the Court's
grant of certiorari. Frady argued that federal courts in the District of Columbia exercise a
purely local jurisdictional function when they rule on a § 2255 motion brought by a prisoner
convicted of a local law offense. The Court ruled that general federal law applies to all
§ 2255 motions. Id at 1590-91.
215. Id at 1592-93.
216. Id.
217. 102 S. Ct. at 1592-93 (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-85
(1979); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1962); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181-
82 (1947)). See supra note 50.
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sumed to stand fairly and finally convicted, particularly in the case of a
federal prisoner who has already had an opportunity to present his federal
claims to a federal forum.21 8 Moreover, the Court had already rejected the
plain error standard for collateral review of a state prisoner's claim in Hen-
derson v. Kibbe.219
The Court held that the proper standard for review of Frady's motion is
the cause and actual prejudice standard of Davis, Francis, and Sykes.22°
Under this standard, to obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to
which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant
must show "both (1) 'cause' excusing his double procedural default, and
(2) 'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he complains."
221
The Court did not have to determine whether Frady had demonstrated
cause, because "he suffered no actual prejudice of a degree sufficient to
justify collateral relief nineteen years after his crime. '"222
In considering the existence of prejudice in Frady's case, the Court
noted that Sykes expressly reserved further elaboration of actual prejudice
to future cases.223 Accordingly, the Court left open the import of actual
prejudice in other situations, but found "no doubt about its meaning for a
defendant who has failed to object to jury instructions at trial., 224 The
Court obtained guidance from its decision in Kibbe, which required that
the degree of prejudice resulting from jury instruction error be evaluated
218. 102 S. Ct. at 1593. The Court emphasized that "folur trial and appellate procedures
are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation any binding effect
beyond the next in a series of endless post-conviction collateral attacks. To the contrary, a
final judgment commands respect." Id Furthermore, since the federal prisoner has already
had an opportunity to present his federal claims in federal trial and appellate forums, there
is "no basis for affording federal prisoners a preferred status when they seek post-conviction
relief." Id
219. 431 U.S. 145 (1977). Kibbe established that the burden of showing prejudice from
an erroneous jury instruction is much greater on collateral attack than the showing required
to establish plain error on direct appeal. Id at 154.
Kibbe involved a state prisoner, thus considerations of comity involving federal court
supervision over state court judgments were not at issue. The Court in Frady noted, how-
ever, that the federal government's interest in the finality of its judgments is no less than that
of the states. 102 S. Ct. at 1593.
220. Id at 1594.
221. Id Frady addresses the proper standard to be used by a district court engaged
pursuant to § 2255 in the collateral review of the original criminal trial. The Court did not
hold that the plain error standard cannot be applied by a court of appeals on direct review of
a district court's conduct of the § 2255 hearing itself. 102 S. Ct. at 1594 n.15. The Court's use
of the term "double procedural default" suggests that the cause and actual prejudice stan-
dard is to apply to procedural defaults on appeal, as well as at trial. See infra note 282.
222. Id at 1594 (footnote omitted).
223. Id at 1595 (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91).
224. 102 S.Ct. at 1595.
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in the total context of the events at trial.225 The Court, therefore, rejected
Frady's claim that erroneous jury instructions "concerning an element of
the crime charged amounts to prejudice per se, regardless of the particular
circumstances. ' 226 Rather, the Court held, Frady must demonstrate "not
merely that the errors at his trial created apossibility of prejudice, but that
they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions. 227
The Court concluded that because of "the strong, uncontradicted evi-
dence of malice in the record," together with Frady's failure to present a
"colorable claim that he acted without malice," Frady failed to demon-
strate the requisite degree of actual prejudice to justify reversal of his
nineteen-year-old conviction.228 This would be a different case, the Court
emphasized, if Frady had presented "affirmative evidence indicating that
he had been convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was innocent. 229
Because Frady had presented no "colorable claim that he acted without
malice," the Court found "no risk of a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. '"230
Justice Brennan vigorously dissented from the Court's holding.231' He
maintained that "the power to notice plain error at any stage of a criminal
proceeding is fundamental to the court's obligation to correct substantial
225. Id. Kibbe summarized the required degree of prejudice accordingly: "'[Whether
the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates
due process,' "not merely whether" 'the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even uni-
versally condemned.'" 102 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154) (citations omit-
ted). See supra note 219.
226. 102 S. Ct. at 1595-96.
227. Id. at 1596 (emphasis in original).
228. Id.
229. Id
230. Id The Court examined the jury instructions that were given at Frady's trial and
found that despite the erroneous malice instructing a rational jury, believing Frady had
formed "a plan to kill ...a positive design to kill" with "reflection and consideration
amounting to deliberation," could not also have believed that he acted in "sudden passion
• ..aroused by adequate provocation. . . causing him to lose his self-control." Id at 1597
(quoting the unpublished trial court manuscript).
. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment because he agreed that Frady did not
demonstrate actual prejudice. He objected, however, to the Court's assertion that Rule 52(b)
was intended solely for use on direct appeal. In his view, the plain error doctrine is specifi-
cally made available to all stages of all criminal proceedings, including collateral review
under § 2255. He argued that the plain error doctrine constitutes an exception to Rule 30's
requirement that defendants make timely objections to instructions, so that Sykes does not
apply. Failing "to give effect to the plain error exception to the federal contemporaneous
objection rule, while recognizing exceptions to the analogous state rules- . . . gives some
state prisoners a 'preferred status.'" 102 S. Ct. at 1599 (citing Ulster County v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 148-54 (1979)).
231. 102 S. Ct. at 1600 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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miscarriages of justice., 232 He asserted that the plain error rule does not
undermine the interest in finality of judgments because it is a permissive,
rather than a mandatory rule.23 3 In contrast to section 2254, which is a
civil proceeding, Justice Brennan observed, section 2255 is a criminal col-
lateral review procedure.2 34 Congress has specifically provided that a sec-
tion 2255 motion is a continuation of the criminal trial, authorizing the
application of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on collateral re-
view for motions brought by federal prisoners.235 The Court's decision
thus fails to provide parity between state and federal prisoners, Justice
Brennan argued, because state courts can waive a procedural default and
permit the state petitioner to seek collateral review in the federal courts.236
Furthermore, state court judges can notice plain error in collateral review
of state court convictions. 237 The Court's decision, however, deprives the
federal judge of the right to recognize plain error on collateral review, re-
stricting the federal prisoner more tightly than the state prisoner.238
Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's decisions in Davis, Francis,
and Sykes were not only inconsistent, but contrary to congressional intent,
evidencing the Court's willingness "to subordinate a prisoner's interest in
substantial justice to a supposed government interest in finality." '239 He
would have decided the case on the ground offered by the government and
adopted by Justice Blackmun, that the instructions at Frady's trial did not
constitute plain error affecting his substantial rights.
2 41
232. Id
233. Id at 1601. Justice Brennan noted that "the significant differences between § 2255
and direct appeal remain unaffected by the application of Rule 52(b) to § 2255 actions." An
error, even if properly preserved, is not cognizable under § 2255 unless it is "a constitutional
violation or an error of law or fact of such 'fundamental character' that it 'renders the entire
proceeding irregular or invalid.' " Id at n.2.
234. 102 S. Ct. at 1601.
235. Id at 1602. See S. REP. No. 1596, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948); see also Advisory
Committee's Notes to § 2255 Rules 1, 3, II, 12, 28 U.S.C. §§ 280, 287.
236. 102 S. Ct. at 1602 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 688 n.7 (1975)).
237. Id
238. Id at 1602-03. Furthermore, the "tensions" inherent in federal court review of state
court convictions do not exist in a § 2255 proceeding, because the prisoner is directed back
to the same court that first convicted him. Id "The plain error doctrine merely allows
federal courts the discretion common to most courts to waive procedural defaults where
justice requires." Id




III. COMITY, FEDERALISM, AND FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS PREVAIL:
LIMITING FEDERAL COURT DISCRETION AND THE SCOPE OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
A major premise underlying the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown v.
Allen,24 the Noia trilogy,242 and Kaufman,243 is that federal habeas courts
havepower to review prior judicial determinations of the federal constitu-
tional claims presented by state and federal prisoners. The Supreme Court
viewed power of federal habeas corpus review as inhering in the Constitu-
tion and derived from congressional authority manifested in the Acts of
1789 and 1867.214 The procedural requirements of exhaustion of state rem-
edies and compliance with adequate state procedural rules were created by
the Supreme Court as limitations upon the exercise of the power of habeas
corpus review, designed to accommodate federal-state comity, federalism
and the finality of state court judgments.
Congressional modification of sections 2254 and 2255 of the Judicial
Code following Townsend and Sanders,2 45 was a powerful sanction of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the nature and proper scope of federal
habeas corpus review of the constitutional claims presented by state and
federal prisoners. Although the exhaustion requirement has been codified
241. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
242. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text;
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text;
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
243. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). See supra notes 76-78 and accom-
panying text.
244. In Fay v. Noia, the Court recognized that the writ of habeas corpus was given ex-
plicit recognition in our Constitution, 372 U.S. 391, 400 n.7 (1963). The Constitution pro-
vides that: "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2. In addition, the writ was incorporated in the first grant of federal court jurisdiction in
the Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82. 372 U.S. at 400. The Court noted that, although
neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789 anywhere defines the writ, id. at 405,
there has been support for the view that "Itihe use of the writ ... as an 'incident of the
federal judicial power' is implicitly recognized by art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the Constitution." Id at
406 (quoting McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 135 (1934)). Furthermore, the Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86, extended "[tihe habeas corpus power of the federal courts
evidently to what was conceived to be its constitutional limit." Noia, 372 U.S. at 417 (citing
Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867)) ("This legislation is of the most
comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction. . . every possible
case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws."). See
also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-12 (1963). The motion remedy under § 2255 for
federal prisoners is as broad as habeas corpus. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952), supra note 25.
245. See supra notes 70, 72 & 75.
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as defined by the Supreme Court,246 Congress has expressed no view re-
garding the treatment of "mixed" habeas petitions and the procedural
"cause and actual prejudice" requirement. 247 The tensions between the
federal interest in the vindication of constitutional rights through the rem-
edy of habeas corpus and the state interest in orderly judicial administra-
tion of its own procedures exist, in part, because neither the Constitution
nor the Congressional Acts of 1789 and 1867 define the writ. The Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the extent to which federal judicial action
curtailing federal habeas corpus review by means of the exhaustion doc-
trine and procedural forfeiture would violate the habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion conferred upon the federal courts by Congress.
Lundy, Isaac, and Frady do not expressly attempt to limit the power of
the federal court to review allegations of unconstitutional restraint, but re-
quire that the exercise of that power be further restrained to promote con-
siderations of comity, federalism and finality of judgments. The import of
the Court's opinions in these cases, however, is the increased potential for
foreclosure of a state or federal prisoner's constitutional claims from fed-
eral habeas corpus review. The effective foreclosure from federal habeas
corpus review, despite the nature of the constitutional violation, is not eas-
ily harmonized with Supreme Court precedent and expressed congres-
sional intent. Although it is clear that the Court has reversed its position
regarding the scope of federal habeas corpus review from that of twenty
years ago, the Court has failed to provide workable guidelines to assure
that fundamental miscarriages of justice will receive federal habeas corpus
relief.
A. Total Exhaustion: Effective Deterrent or Superfluous Result?
The Supreme Court's adoption of the total exhaustion requirement in
Lundy may be viewed as theoretically consistent with the exhaustion re-
quirement codified in section 2254(b)-(c). The federal court's power to re-
view the state habeas petitioner's constitutional claim is not affected.
Instead, Lundy further limits the exercise of that power by requiring that
the federal district court entertain only those petitions containing ex-
hausted claims.
Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the total exhaustion requirement is
commanded by precedent, the provisions of section 2254, or by the policy
246. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-2254(c) (1976). See also supra note 47.
247. Currently, however, proposals to codify the cause and actual prejudice requirement
are before the Senate. See Crime Control Act of 1982, tit. 10-Habeas Corpus Reform, S.
2543, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Finality of Criminal Judgments Improvements Act, S.
2838, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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considerations discussed by the Court.248 Although the Court contended
that the total exhaustion requirement is necessary to promote federal-state
comity, a flexible rule of partial exhaustion, under which the federal dis-
trict court entertained the exhausted claims while dismissing the
unexhausted claims, was a sufficient accommodation of the federal-state
balance. Because comity considerations are not defeated under the partial
exhaustion rule favored by the majority of the circuit courts of appeals,
24 9
any usefulness of a per se rule is superflous.25 °
The Court's decision may, in fact, be "premised on the spectre of the
'sophisticated litigious prisoner intent upon a strategy of piecemeal litiga-
tion' . . . whose only aim is to have more than one day in federal habeas
court."25' What little discussion there is on the subject suggests that most
state petitioners attempt to consolidate all of their claims in one petition.252
Additionally, as the dissent indicated, it is unlikely that the Court's total
exhaustion rule will seriously affect the "sophisticated prisoner" who will
248. See supra text accompanying notes 120, 133-35 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 117, 133-35.
250. As Justice Blackmun observed, "[t]o the extent that prisoners are permitted simply
to strike unexhausted claims from a § 2254 petition and then proceed as if those claims had
never been presented, I fail to see what all the fuss is about. In that event, the Court's
approach is virtually indistinguishable from that of the Court of Appeals, which directs the
district court itself to dismiss unexhausted grounds for relief." Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct at
1209 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d
348, 370 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]his [partial exhaustion] rule protects
the petitioner's interest in speedy consideration of his federal claim while at the same time
giving full effect to the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine."). Furthermore, the
district courts have adequately addressed the problem of interrelated claims. The majority
of circuits that permitted the district courts to review the exhausted claims in a mixed peti-
tion, see supra note 117, handled the problem of interrelated claims by allowing the district
court to decide the exhausted issues unless the exhausted and unexhausted claims were so
interrelated that they could not be independently decided. In that event the entire petition
was dismissed. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States District Court, 519 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir.
1975); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Myers, 372 F.2d I11,
112-13 (3d Cir. 1967).
251. 102 S. Ct. at 1209 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d
at 369 (Goldberg, J., dissenting)).
252. See Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv.
321 (1973). Of 257 cases studied, only 34 habeas petitions were filed by prisoners who had
filed any previous petitions. Twenty-three of these thirty-four had filed only one other peti-
tion. Id. at 353-54. This data suggests that the repeat petition is of rather minor significance
in the habeas corpus caseload. Thus, even if a rule of total exhaustion induces each repeat
petitioner to bring every one of his claims in a single proceeding, the efficiency gains
achieved may be offset by the time spent by the federal courts in duplicative examination of
the record, especially when non-meritorious claims are involved. See Galtieri v. Wain-
wright, 582 F.2d 348, 374 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, C.J., dissenting).
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simply present successive petitions presenting only exhausted claims.2 53 In
practical application, the total exhaustion requirement limits the discretion
of the federal district court to entertain meritorious exhausted claims when
paired with unexhausted claims, 254 requires duplicative review of state
habeas petitions,255 and fails to promote uniformity in the disposition of
the federal habeas petitions of state prisoners.
2 5 6
While potentially burdensome to state petitioners and federal district
courts, however, the total exhaustion requirement should not, by itself, de-
prive the state petitioner of his day in federal habeas court. The petitioner
may delete the unexhausted claims, proceed to review of his exhausted
claims, and resubmit the previously unexhausted claims following their ex-
haustion in state court.257 The plurality's application of the abuse of the
253. 102 S. Ct. at 1209 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
254. As a result, the petitioner's interest in speedy relief on his federal constitutional
claims may be frustrated. He may be required to repeat his journey through the federal
courts before his meritorious claims are heard. Professor Shapiro discusses one exhaustion
case, for example, which was remanded for a hearing on the ground that, if the facts had
been as petitioner alleged, "requiring him to further seek state relief in some unguided,
open-ended way, thereby countenancing further delay, would [have] deprive[d] him of due
process of law." Shapiro, supra note 252, at 357 (citing Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806, 807
(1st Cir. 1971)). In Odsen, the petitioner alleged that he filed a pro se writ with a single
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The Massachusetts Defenders Com-
mittee was appointed to represent him. Three years later no action had been taken despite
correspondence with the Committee and the state court. The federal district court had dis-
missed for failure to exhaust and had denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Id at
806.
255. See, supra note 138-39 and accompanying text. Duplicative review will not neces-
sarily be an insignificant burden. In Shapiro's study of 257 cases, for example, 135 cases,
more than 50%, were dismissed for failure to exhaust. In approximately 100 of the cases
dismissed, failure to exhaust was the sole ground for dismissal. Shapiro, supra note 252, at
356.
256. See, supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Moreover, lower federal courts are in-
terpreting Lundy broadly to prevent foreclosure from habeas corpus review on total exhaus-
tion grounds. See, e.g., Romano v. Wyrick, No. 81-2110, slip op. (8th Cir. July 7, 1982). In
Romano, although the petitioner presented a petition containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims, the court did not dismiss the petition in its entirety for failure to ex-
haust under Lundy. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because the petitioner did not raise
the probation-revocation issue in his petition to the district court, that court addressed a
petition containing only fully exhausted claims.
We think the Lundy rule should not be applied mechanically in this situation. Va-
cating the district court's determination in those circumstances would provide pris-
oners with the opportunity to relitigate an issue before the district court by merely
adding a claim on appeal, getting the entire petition dismissed, and once again
going through the state courts. This would be a great waste of time and effort and
cannot be what Rose intended.
Id at 4 n.3. See also Dunn v. Wyrick, No. 81-2429, slip op. (8th Cir. June 1, 1982) (total
exhaustion rule inapplicable where the exhausted claims were fully litigated and decided in
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writ doctrine may effect that result, however. Although the plurality did
not direct federal district courts to dismiss subsequent petitions containing
previously unexhausted claims as an abuse of the writ, the plurality sug-
gested that federal courts have complete license to do so. 258
The plurality's construction of the abuse of the writ doctrine, as applied
in the context of the total exhaustion requirement, departs significantly
from the knowing and deliberate standard enunciated in Sanders and in-
corporated by Congress in Rule 9(b) to determine whether abuse is pres-
ent. Sanders provided that the principles developed in Noia and
Townsend would govern whether a second or successive application may
be deemed an abuse of the writ or motion remedy. Noia adopted the defi-
nition of an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege" as the standard controlling the determination of a deliberate
bypass of state procedure and then, only after the federal court has con-
ducted a hearing or determined the issue by some other means.25 9 Town-
send discussed a petitioner's inexcusable neglect in bringing evidence to
the attention of the state court in terms of Noia's deliberate bypass stan-
dard.26° In enacting the provisions of Rule 9(b), Congress rejected an in-
excusable standard for review of second or subsequent petitions in favor of
the Sander's abuse standard, finding that the inexcusable standard would
provide too much discretion to the federal district judge to dismiss subse-
quent petitions.26' As noted by Justice Brennan in Lundy, a petitioner's
failure to have asserted previously unexhausted claims in a prior petition
the district court prior to the Lundy decision); Floyd v. Marshall, 538 F. Supp. 381 (N.D.
Ohio 1982). The Floyd court considered the defendant's habeas corpus petition even though
it presented an unexhausted claim. The Ohio post-conviction statute afforded the defendant
no avenue to present such grounds to Ohio's courts, and the defendant was unable to pursue
a delayed appeal of his conviction. The court reasoned that Lundy could not "have intended
to legislate away clearly-stated provisions of the habeas corpus statute" which requires a
petitioner to have exhausted the state remedies actually available to him prior to considera-
tion of the issues in a habeas corpus action. Id at 383 (emphasis in original). In addition,
the district court observed that the Supreme Court in Lundy referred to its decision in Ex
parte Hawk, which recognized that the exhaustion doctrine did not bar relief "where the
state remedies are inadequate or fail to 'afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal
contentions raised.'" 538 F. Supp. at 384 (quoting Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118
(1944)), noted in 102 S. Ct. at 1202 n.7.
258. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
259. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439 (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948)
(proposing as an alternative to a hearing "an amendment or elaboration" of the petitioner's
pleadings)).
260. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 317. "The standard of inexcusable default set down
in Fay v. Noia adequately protects the legitimate state interest in orderly criminal proce-
dure, for it does not sanction needless piecemeal presentation of constitutional claims in the
form of deliberate by-passing of state procedure." Id
261. See supra note 144.
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will have been required by the habeas court itself as a condition for consid-
eration of the exhausted claims.262 To dismiss the subsequent petition as
an abuse of the writ merely because it presents the previously unexhausted
claims, without further inquiry into factual circumstances truly suggesting
abuse, disregards the principles and considerations expressed by the Court
in Sanders and by Congress in Rule 9(b), and dilutes the concept of
abuse.263
The effect of the plurality's interpretation of the abuse of the writ doc-
trine as applied to the total exhaustion requirement is not entirely predict-
able. It is unlikely, however, that federal courts will dismiss a subsequent
petition as an abuse of the writ simply because it presents grounds for
relief not assertable in the first petition because those grounds were not
exhausted at that time. The doctrine has been regarded as one of "rare
and extraordinary application. ' 264 Courts have required as a factual pred-
icate that the petitioner deliberately bypassed the opportunity to present
his available claim in the first proceeding.265 Some courts have dismissed
unexhausted claims without prejudice, facilitating the petitioner's opportu-
262. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
263. The burden is on the government to plead abuse of the writ. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1963). Once the government has done this, the petitioner has the
burden of proving that he has not abused the writ. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292
(1948). The Advisory Committee suggests that, if it appears to the court after examining the
petition and answer that there is a high probability that the petition will be barred under
Rule 9, the court should afford the petitioner an opportunity to explain his apparent abuse.
28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9, Advisory Committee Notes, at 1139 (1976). See also Johnson v.
Copinger, 420 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1969) ("[A] procedure which allows the imposition of a
forfeiture for abuse of the writ, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to be heard
on the issue, [does not comport] with minimum requirements of fairness"). Some commen-
tators contend that the problem of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus is greatly overstated.
See, e.g., Developments, supra note 1, at 1153 ("Most prisoners, of course, are interested in
being released as soon as possible; only rarely will one inexcusably neglect to raise all avail-
able issues in his first federal application.") See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES, § 6.2, commentary at 92 (Approved Draft, 1968) ("The occasional,
highly litigious prisoner stands out as the rarest exception.").
264. Simpson v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 494, 495 (5th Cir. 1973) (abuse of the writ doc-
trine "could not apply to bar a return to the federal court by one who has been remitted to
the state courts to exhaust and reappears alleging that he has done just that").
265. See, e.g., Halley v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980) (pro se petitioner
"should not be penalized because his inexperience in jurisprudence left him unaware of
claims he had not considered at the time of his first application for habeas corpus."); Mays v.
Balkcom, 631 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1980); Turnbow v. Beto, 464 F.2d 527, 528 (5th Cir.
1972); Tannehill v. Fitzharris, 451 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1971) (no deliberate omission
where failure to bring all claims in earlier petition resulted from good faith belief that claims
earlier presented would have been barred on exhaustion grounds); Johnson v. Copincer, 420
F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969) (judge may not dismiss petition on ground of abuse without first
giving notice to petitioner, affording him opportunity to amend his petition to offer any
explanation which would justify omission or show that omission was not deliberate).
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nity for review of the previously unexhausted claims once he has ex-
hausted them in state court.266 Consequently, although Lundy has erected
greater procedural hurdles to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, federal
habeas corpus review of a state prisoner's constitutional claims should not
be significantly curtailed.
B. Isaac Cause and Frady Prejudice: Reinterpreting Sykes and the
Nature of Federal Habeas Corpus Review
Although federal habeas corpus review should not be significantly cur-
tailed in the wake of Lundy, that argument does not apply with equal force
in a discussion of Isaac and Frady. As in Lundy, Isaac and Frady do not
limit the power, but the exercise of the power of federal habeas corpus
review in cases of procedural default. The federal district court is directed
to abstain from collateral review when the petitioner has failed to demon-
strate cause and actual prejudice excusing a failure to object to errors at
trial. But the Court's application of the concepts of cause and actual
prejudice in Isaac and Frady may effectively preclude the federal district
court from considering meritorious constitutional claims, particularly
claims of error that may have affected the determination of the petitioner's
guilt at trial. This result conflicts with Supreme Court precedent recogniz-
ing federal habeas corpus as a remedy for constitutional violations that are'
fundamentally unfair.267 Instead, under Isaac and Frady, the lower fed-
eral courts must determine what constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of
justice sufficient to satisfy or supplant the cause and actual prejudice,
inquiry.
268
266. See, e.g., Romano v. Wyrick, No. 81-2110, slip op. (8th Cir. July 7, 1982) (dis-
missing without prejudice claim of unconstitutional revocation of probation for failure to
exhaust available state remedies). Lamberti v. Wainwright, 513 F.2d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir.
1975); Harris v. Estelle, 487 F.2d 1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098,
1101 (9th Cir. 1972).
267. The Court in Noia described habeas corpus as a remedy for "whatever society
seems to be intolerable restraints," which "lies to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless
that imprisonment pursuant to them is not merely erroneous but void." 372 U.S. 391, 401,
423 (1963). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). In Stone v. Powell, the
Court distinguished the withdrawal of exclusionary rule claims from habeas corpus review
as justified because in asserting such claims "a convicted defendant is usually asking society
to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." 428
U.S. 465, 492 n.31 (1976). In contrast, as Justices Brennan and Marshall noted, there is a
distinction between claims that affect the truthfinding function of the trial and claims that do
not. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1583 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Isaac, Justice
Brennan emphasized that "a defendant's right to a trial at which the burden of proof has
been constitutionally allocated can never be violated without rendering the entire trial result
untrustworthy." Id. (emphasis in original).
268. See infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
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The cause and actual prejudice requirement is a judicially created doc-
trine of waiver or forfeiture. Since federal habeas review is designed to
protect the prisoner's interests in freedom from illegal or unconstitutional
confinement, denying him the opportunity to assert federal constitutional
rights is a rather drastic step. Therefore, to guard against indiscriminate
forfeiture of federal habeas review of constitutional claims, the criteria for
determining when a procedural default will bar federal habeas review
should be clear and easily applied.269 Isaac and Frady fail to provide
much more clarity than did Sykes in their application of the concepts of
cause and actual prejudice to other situations involving procedural de-
fault.2 7 ° This lack of clarity will result in disparate applications of the
cause and actual prejudice standard. Courts will either be too lax or too
harsh in attempting to apply the concepts of cause and actual prejudice.
When the lower court's application is too harsh, a person's liberty, as well
as important constitutional rights may be affected.
I. "Cause" The Absence of "Tools" to Construct the
Constitutional Argument
The Court in Sykes noted that the cause and actual prejudice standard
was narrower than the deliberate bypass standard of Noia. Beyond that,
the Court did not define cause for application in future cases. As to the
respondent Sykes, the Court observed that cause did not exist because he
had provided no explanation for his failure to object to the testimony ob-
tained in violation of his Miranda rights which was admitted at his trial.27'
In Isaac, the Court noted that the nature of a claim alleging unconstitu-
tional allocation of the burden of proving self-defense, in contrast to a
Miranda claim, may affect the determination of guilt at trial. Nevertheless,
the Court imposed the requirement that a habeas petitioner make the
threshold showing of cause and actual prejudice to excuse a procedural
default.272 Rather than address the nature of federal habeas corpus review
and the constitutional interests it is designed to protect, the Court merely
asserted that the principles of Sykes are not limited by the nature of the
269. Noia's "primary virtue" was that it provided a "coherent yardstick for federal dis-
trict courts in rationalizing their power of collateral review." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 116 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. "The Court still refuses to say what 'cause' is.... [b]ut ... is more than eager to
say what 'cause' is not." Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1580 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original). In Frady, the Court left open the import of "actual prejudice" in
situations other than failures to object to erroneous jury instructions at trial. United States
v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584-95 (1982).
271. 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
272. 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572 (1982).
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constitutional claim presented. 273 Thus, under Isaac, if defense counsel
fails to raise constitutional arguments that he had the tools to construct,
the petitioner is barred from asserting those claims on habeas corpus re-
view, despite the substantive nature of the constitutional claim involved or
the error's effect upon the determination of guilt at trial.274
The Court's decision in Ysaac does not automatically follow from Sykes.
In Sykes, the Court did not weigh the cost considerations275 of federal
habeas review of state court judgments against the forfeiture of constitu-
tional claims affecting the determination of guilt at trial. In fact, the Court
has consistently acknowledged that habeas corpus is designed to protect
against convictions that violate fundamental fairness. 27 6 Furthermore, the
sandbagging rationale of Sykes makes no sense as a trial tactic when ap-
plied to an attorney's failure to raise a claim that is inchoate, as was argua-
bly the case in Isaac, or when the failure to object is due to attorney
neglect or negligence.277 Apparently, the sandbagging concern has been
replaced in Isaac with a prohibition against attorney failure to utilize the
tools with which to construct the constitutional argument at trial.278
As in Sykes, the Isaac Court did not resolve whether attorney ignorance
or error beyond the habeas petitioner's control could ever adequately dis-
charge the cause burden.279 Isaac suggests, however, that at least some
sixth amendment claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may be
excluded from federal habeas corpus review. The Court rejected adoption
of a rule requiring trial counsel to exercise "extraordinary vision" or "to
object to every aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect
might mask a latent constitutional claim. 28° Moreover, the Court com-
mented that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "only a fair
trial and a competent attorney," and not that every conceivable constitu-
273. Id at 1572. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
274. Id at 1574. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 267. Moreover, Wainwright Y. Sykes may be justified, as was Stone,
on the grounds that it involved a Miranda claim. See supra note 33. As Justice Stevens
observed, because "the police fully complied with Miranda, the deterrent purpose of the
Miranda rule [was] inapplicable" and there was "clearly no basis for claiming that the trial
violated any standard of fundamental fairness." Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
277. See supra notes 193 & 196 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
279. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 116-17 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan presents a formidable argument against punishing a lawyer's errors by closing
the federal courthouse door to his client when fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.
Id at 114-18.
280. 102 S. Ct. at 1573.
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tional claim will be recognized and raised.28' It is inconceivable that the
Court would permit a habeas petitioner to circumvent the cause require-
ment set forth in Isaac by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as
cause because the attorney failed to perceive and litigate a "knowable"
constitutional claim.2"2 In determining that the alleged unawareness of an
objection does not constitute cause where the basis of a constitutional
claim is available and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated
the constitutional claim, 2 3 the Supreme Court may have effectively ex-
cluded newly-recognized constitutional claims from habeas corpus re-
view.28 4 The Court refused to decide whether the novelty of a
constitutional claim ever constitutes cause for a failure to object at trial.
2 5
But habeas petitioners are held to such a "high standard of foresight," as
emphasized by the dissent, that the Court's holding amounts to a complete
rejection that a claim may be so inchoate that adequate cause exists for the
the failure to raise it.
286
Isaac creates an additional area of confusion for the lower federal courts
in attempting to apply the concepts of cause and actual prejudice to other
cases of procedural default. In refusing to decide whether the novelty of a
constitutional claim ever establishes cause excusing a procedural default,
the Court stated that subsequent discovery of a latent constitutional defect
"does not invariably render the original trial fundamentally unfair."
28 7
This statement was made in the context of the Court's discussion of cause,
making it difficult to discern whether the Court means to incorporate such
281. Id at 1574.
282. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. This argument has been raised with
respect to a defendant's attempt to base an appeal upon ineffective assistance of counsel
rather than upon the issue not raised by counsel in an attempt to satisfy Sykes. See Tague,
The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 129
& n. 114 (1977). See also Washington v. Gibson, 50 U.S.L.W. 3866 (1982). In Gibson v.
Spalding, 665 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1981), the court of appeals held that the petitioner's failure
to challenge on direct appeal a jury instruction that improperly shifted the burden of proof
to the defense under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), did not preclude federal
habeas corpus consideration of that claim because the defense lawyer's failure to raise the
Mullaney issue amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, providing cause for petitioner's
failure to timely raise that claim timely. Id. The Supreme Court ordered the judgment
vacated and the case remanded "for further consideration in light of Isaac and Frady,"
Washington v. Gibson, 50 U.S.L.W. 3915 (1982). Apparently, the cause and actual
prejudice standard applies to procedural defaults on appeal, as well as at trial. See also
supra note 221 and accompanying text.
283. 102 S. Ct. at 1574-75.
284. See supra note 173.
285. 102 S. Ct. at 1573.
286. Id at 1580 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. 102 S. Ct. at 1573. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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an inquiry in the calculation of cause, or is merely referring to the require-
ment that the habeas petitioner also demonstrate actual prejudice.
2 'Actual Prejudice'" No Less Than a Colorable
Showing of Innocence?
Frady extends the cause and actual prejudice standard of Sykes to cases
of procedural default by federal prisoners seeking collateral relief under
section 2255. Francis applied the cause and actual prejudice requirement
of Davis to a state prisoner's failure to object to grand jury composition in
order to achieve parity between state and federal prisoners. Frady's appli-
cation of Sykes to instances of procedural default by federal prisoners may
therefore be logically consistent. Moreover, Davis provides a foundation
for extending the cause and actual prejudice standard to other instances of
procedural default by federal prisoners.288 It is not entirely clear, however,
that Congress intended the plain error standard to apply only on direct
review.289 Accordingly, the Court's rejection of the plain error standard
was not necessarily warranted, but result-oriented to permit application of
the cause and actual prejudice standard to bar review of a federal pris-
oner's section 2255 motion.
The Court arrived at this result to accommodate the government's inter-
est in the finality of judgments. Although it is well-settled that collateral
review may not substitute for an appeal,29 precedent does not suggest that
collateral review should be withheld from a federal prisoner because his
trial and appeal took place before a federal tribunal. The Court in Frady
rejected, without squarely confronting, the Kaufman premise that the fed-
eral prisoner's right to collateral review is not merely a right to a federal
forum, but a right to full and fair consideration of federal constitutional
claims.29" ' The issue is not, as framed by the Court, whether "[ojur trial
and appellate procedures are . . . so unreliable that we may not afford
their completed operation any binding effect beyond the next in a series of
288. Justice Brennan argued vigorously to the contrary, however. 102 S. Ct. at 1600. In
his opinion, Francis and Sykes applied an appropriate rule of criminal procedure from Da-
vis to a civil proceeding. Moreover, in Frady, he argued, the Court excluded
the applicability in a criminal proceeding of a rule of criminal procedure plainly
intended by Congress to be available to federal prisoners. The inconsistency in
these decisions lies in their announcement that even under the pressures of clear
congressional direction to the contrary, this Court will strain to subordinate a pris-
oner's interest in substantial justice to a supposed interest in finality.
102 S. Ct. at 1604 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. See supra notes 230, 232-35 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 50 & 217 and accompanying text.
291. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969). See supra notes 76-78, 218 and
accompanying text.
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endless post-conviction collateral attacks. 292 In enacting section 2255,
Congress deemed it appropriate to provide federal prisoners a remedy col-
lateral to the available appellate procedures by which to challenge his
conviction.
The Court also failed to address the fact that, unlike the statutory provi-
sion governing habeas corpus for state prisoners under section 2254, Con-
gress has specifically provided in section 2255 that "[a] motion for such
relief may be made at any time." '293 The Court's repeated reference to
Frady's "long-delayed" section 2255 motion was therefore inappropriate
and misleading. Indeed, Congress has provided for collateral review of a
federal prisoner's constitutional claims, no matter how long the original
judgment is final, subject only to the limitation of proof of prejudice to the
government resulting from delay in filing the motion.
294
After Frady, the federal prisoner will forfeit collateral review unless he
is able to meet the cause and actual prejudice standard. The standard of
actual prejudice presented in Frady differs considerably from that estab-
lished in Sykes, however. Prejudice did not exist in Sykes because "[t]he
other evidence of guilt presented at trial . . . was substantial to a degree
that would negate any possibility of actual prejudice resulting to the re-
spondent from the admission of his inculpatory statement. ' 295
In contrast, the Frady Court established that the petitioner is required to
"shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial
created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitu-
tional dimensions. ' 296 The precise actual prejudice standard to be applied
after Frady is difficult to discern. In addition to the Court's "actual and
substantial disadvantage" test, the Court discussed two other formulations
of the actual prejudice requirement. At one point, the Court suggested
what more nearly resembles an "overwhelming evidence" test which some
courts have viewed as the applicable test under Sykes .297 The Court stated
292. 102 S. Ct. at 1592. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
293. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). Furthermore, as the Court observed in Kaufman, "[t]he
opportunity to assert federal rights in a federal forum is clearly not the sole justification for
federal post-conviction relief; otherwise there would be no need to make such relief avail-
able to federal prisoners at all." 394 U.S. at 226.
294. 102 S. Ct. at 1593. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (1976). In Kaufman, the Court recog-
nized that "[tihe provision of federal collateral remedies rests more fundamentally upon a
recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial
process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief." 394 U.S. at 226.
295. 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
296. 102 S. Ct. at 1596 (emphasis in original). See supra note 225-27 and accompanying
text.
297. Justice Brennan likened the Sykes standard to the harmless-error doctrine. Wain-
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that "the strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled
with Frady's utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that he
acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he suffered such ac-
tual prejudice that reversal of his conviction 19 years later could be justi-
fied. ' ,298 Elsewhere, however, the Court stated that Frady would have had
a different case had he presented "affirmative evidence indicating that he
had been convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was innocent. 299
Under the first formulation, actual and substantial disadvantage is poten-
tially shown by an absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The final
statement, however, suggests that actual prejudice may not be demon-
strated absent a colorable showing of innocence. 3°
Without regard to proving cause, this construction of actual prejudice
may alone extinguish federal habeas corpus review in cases involving pro-
cedural default. The habeas petitioner may have difficulty merely present-
ing his claim, much less producing affirmative evidence of his innocence.
He does not automatically receive a free trial transcript, appointment of an
attorney to assist him, or discovery to enable him to present his case at his
habeas corpus hearing.3' In the case of erroneous jury instructions charg-
ing the defendant with the burden of proving self-defense, the petitioner
faces the seemingly impossible task of showing that the jury would have
found him innocent but for the erroneous instructions. Although, as in
Sykes, the Court left open the import of the term "actual prejudice" in
situations other than a defendant's failure to object to jury instructions at
trial,3 2 lower federal courts have only the Sykes and Frady definitions of
actual prejudice to rely upon. Of course, as demonstrated in Isaac, even if
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A majority of lower federal courts
surveyed after Sykes applied similar overwhelming evidence tests, much like that of harm-
less error. See Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes.- The Lower Courts Respond, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1683, 1702-03 (1979).
298. 102 S. Ct. at 1596.
299. Id
300. The term "colorable showing of innocence," which is not used by the Court in iden-
tical form, is attributable to Judge Friendly. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 160. Judge
Friendly's formulation of the criterion appears less stringent than the Frady "actual and
substantial disadvantage" text. The petitioner seeking collateral relief must show that there
is
a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence
tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only
after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of
his guilt.
Id.
301. See Tague, supra note 282, at 129 and cases cited therein.
302. 102 S. Ct. at 1595.
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the petitioner is able to demonstrate actual prejudice, he will be barred
from federal habeas review of that allegation if he is unable to surmount
the cause requirement.3 °3
In order to ensure that cases of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will
receive federal habeas corpus review despite a petitioner's procedural de-
fault, the Supreme Court has provided that, in appropriate cases, he con-
cepts of cause and actual prejudice must yield to the "imperative of a
fundamentally unjust incarceration.,, 3 ' 4 According to the Court, "victims
of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice
requirement., 305 The concepts of a fundamentally unjust incarceration
and a fundamental miscarriage of justice are not self-defining, however,
and the Court has provided little guidance for making such a determina-
tion. In Frady, the Court could simply "perceive no risk of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice."3 °6 In Isaac, although the Court stated that the
concepts of cause and actual prejudice are to yield to a fundamentally un-
just incarceration,30 7 the Court also specified that the nature of the claim
does not negate the need to make the threshold showing of cause and ac-
tual prejudice.308 It remains unclear whether in an appropriate case, the
cause and actual prejudice principles are simply not applied when a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice is demonstrated, or whether a demonstration
of a miscarriage of justice satisfies the cause and actual prejudice
requirement.
The Court is able to restrict habeas review through deference to proce-
dural rules with statutory impunity, because cause and actual prejudice are
judicially created concepts, which do not attempt to limit the power of
habeas corpus review. The concepts of cause and actual prejudice derive
their meaning from the principles of comity and finality.3 9 Accordingly,
as courts attribute more value to comity and finality, the cause and actual
prejudice standard will be interpreted more stringently to limit federal
habeas corpus review. Thus, the application of the cause and actual
303. Cause and actual prejudice is a dual standard. Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1594. In Isaac,
the Court disagreed that the existing prejudice was so great that habeas relief should be
granted even in the absence of "cause," noting that Sykes stated these criteria in the con-
junctive. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1575 n.43.
304. 102 S. Ct. at 1575.
305. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91).
306. 102 S. Ct. at 1596.
307. 102 S. Ct. at 1575. If Justices Brennan and Marshall are correct in stating that the
entire trial result becomes untrustworthy when the burden of proof is improperly allocated,
as it was in Isaac, see supra notes 200, 267, 267, Isaac's resulting incarceration was, arguably,
fundamentally unjust.
308. Id. at 1572.
309. Id. at 1575.
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prejudice requirement to constitutional claims that affect the truthfinding
function at trial was justified in Isaac to balance the petitioner's interest in
federal habeas corpus review of his constitutional claims against the state's
interest in. administering its criminal justice system without unwarranted
federal court interference. Comity considerations underlie Lundy's total
exhaustion requirement as well. In Frady, the Court's view of the need for
finality in criminal judgments was controlling.
Unfortunately, the Court's determination to tighten up on liberal allow-
ance of habeas corpus may be founded upon a totally erroneous premise.
The Court in Isaac asserted that "federal intrusions may seriously under-
mine the morale of our state judges, ' 3 t0 but very few habeas petitions are
actually granted to state prisoners.3 1 Similary, if Lundy derives from the
belief that state petitioners are abusing the writ of habeas corpus solely
because of a presumed increase in the number of habeas petitions filed,
that decision is based on an erroneous premise. The number of state
habeas petitions has, indeed, increased since Brown v. Allen was de-
cided,31 2 but the State prison population has also increased dramati-
cally.313 Moreover, over the last ten years, the number of state habeas
petitions filed has not increased, but fluctuated slightly, despite the more
than two-fold increase in State prison population.3t 4 Any increases in
habeas petitions filed may more accurately reflect this two-fold increase in
the state prison population rather than state prisoner abuse of the habeas
corpus remedy.
Although comity, federalism, and finality of judgments are important
societal interests, Congress has chosen to provide a federal forum for the
collateral review of the constitutional claims of state and federal prisoners.
As Justice Brennan noted in his Sykes dissent, the Court has never taken
issue with Noia's foundation principle that "federal courts possess the
power to look beyond a state procedural forfeiture in order to entertain [a
310. 102 S. Ct. at 1572 n.33. See supra note 173.
311. Empirical data is scarce and antiquated. In 1971, the administrative office of the
United States Court reported that in 96% of prisoner petitions "the matter prayed for is not
granted." See Shapiro, infra note 252, at 333 (quoting ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF
THE U.S. 167-79 (1971)). In the 12-year period from 1946 to 1957, state habeas petitioners
were reportedly successful in 1.4% of the cases. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 445 n.l (citing
H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1959)). A 1950's study of 126 different petition-
ers disclosed that in only one case was the writ of habeas corpus granted. See Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 526 (1953) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
312. 549 petitions were filed by state prisoners in 1953. That number increased to 7,790
in 1981. Source: Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
313. The State prison population increased from 154,184 in 1953 to 340,876 in 1981.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
314. In fact, there has been a dramatic decrease of habeas petitions filed, when expressed
as a percentage of the state prison population:
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petitioner's] contention that [his] constitutional rights have been
abridged." '315 Perhaps the decisive question, then, is whether "[u]nder the
guise of fashioning procedural rules," the Court is justified "in wiping out
the practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District
Courts."'3 16 Nevertheless, the vitality of federal habeas corpus review may
be assured by the vigilance of the lower federal courts in broadly interpret-
ing the concepts of cause and actual prejudice and in identifying funda-
mental unfairness when determining whether a prisoner's procedural
default should bar federal habeas corpus review.317 Similarly, the federal
STATE PRISONERS CONFINED
AND PRISONER PETITIONS
FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
TOTAL HABEAS HABEAS PETITIONS FILED
PETITIONS PETITIONS BY STATE PRISONERS
TOTAL FILED BY FILED BY EXPRESSED AS A
STATE PRISON STATE STATE PERCENTAGE OF
YEAR POPULATIONa PRISONERSb PRISONERSc STATE PRISON POPULATION
1971 .... 117,113 12,145 8,372 7.2%
1972 .... 174,470 12,088 7,949 4.6%
1973 .... 181,534 12.683 7,784 4.3%
1974 .... 207,630 13,423 7,626 3.8%
1975 .... 229,685 14,260 7,843 3.4%
1976 .... 249,408 15,029 7,833 3.1%
1977 .... 260,747 14,846 6,866 2.6%
1978 .... 276,799 16,969 7,033 2.5%
1979 .... 287,635 18,502 7,123 2.5%
1980 .... 304,332 19,574 7,031 2.3%
1981 .... 340,876 23,607 7,790 2.3%
1982d ... 355,887 24,975 8,059 2.3%
NOTE: aThe prison population consists of all prisoners who have been sentenced as adults or youthful
offenders and whose maximum sentence length is a year and a day or longer. Beginning in 1972.
this definition was adopted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Bureau of
the Census for use in compiling statistics for the National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) program.
Beginning in 1977. the data reflects prison population with state or federal jurisdiction, therefore,
the figures exclude local or county jurisdiction. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
blncludes mandamus, civil rights, habeas corpus, and all other state prisoner petitions filed. Filings
for the year ended June 30. Source: Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts.
cFilings for year ended June 30. Source: Annual Report of the Director. Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts.
dAs of March 31. 1982.
315. 433 U.S. 72, 100 n.2 (1977).
316. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 498-99.
317. In large measure, the position to which federal habeas corpus review is elevated or
relegated reflects society's attitude toward the imprisoned. A judge's time is, indeed, pre-
cious, see Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, C.J., dissent-
ing), but so are the "precious commodities" of human life and liberty and the constitutional
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courts may exercise their discretion to assure that abuse of the writ is
found only when substantially indicated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lundy, Isaac, and Frady evidence the very different nature of federal
habeas corpus review from that of twenty years ago when the writ was
regarded as the guardian of fundamental rights of personal liberty. The
Court has not returned to pre-Noia standards entirely in cases of proce-
dural default, and a petitioner's inclusion of unexhausted claims is not an
absolute foreclosure from federal habeas review of those claims. Under
the Court's construction of cause and actual prejudice in Isaac and Frady,
however, and the plurality's application of the abuse of the writ doctrine in
Lundy, the Court may accomplish the restriction of habeas corpus review
of substantive, meritorious constitutional claims by going in through the
procedural back door. The Court has provided insufficient guidance in de-
fining and applying the concepts of cause and actual prejudice. As a result,
procedural defaults will place a heavy burden upon practitioners and pro
se petitioners to conform within vaguely delineated parameters or forever
forfeit post-conviction federal habeas relief. In curbing the scope of fed-
eral habeas corpus review, the Court has come perilously close to disre-
garding, if not reinterpreting, the habeas corpus statutes.
Mary Ann Snow
guarantees the great writ is designed to preserve. See id. As one distinguished jurist has
observed:
The aim which justifies the existence of habeas corpus is not fundamentally differ-
ent from that which informs our criminal law in general, that it is better that a
guilty man go free than that an innocent one be punished. . . . What is involved
... [i]s. . . the creative process of writing specific content into the highest of our
ideals. So viewed, the burdensome test of sifting the meritorious from the worthless
appears less futile, and there is less room for the emotions of federalism.
Schaefer, Federalism and Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. I, 25 (1956).
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